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Abstract This article introduces a new computational model
for the complex-span task, the most popular task for studying
working memory. SOB-CS is a two-layer neural network that
associates distributed item representations with distributed,
overlapping position markers. Memory capacity limits are
explained by interference from a superposition of associa-
tions. Concurrent processing interferes with memory through
involuntary encoding of distractors. Free time in-between
distractors is used to remove irrelevant representations, there-
by reducing interference. The model accounts for benchmark
findings in four areas: (1) effects of processing pace, process-
ing difficulty, and number of processing steps; (2) effects of
serial position and error patterns; (3) effects of different kinds
of item–distractor similarity; and (4) correlations between
span tasks. The model makes several new predictions in these
areas, which were confirmed experimentally.
Keywords Working memory . Computational modeling
Working memory can be characterized as a system for
holding a limited amount of information available for pro-
cessing. Its limited capacity has been shown to have con-
siderable generality across various contents and methods of
measurement (Kane et al., 2004; Oberauer, Süß, Schulze,
Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000). Variations in working mem-
ory between groups and between individuals have been
shown to correlate with performance in a broad range of
complex cognitive activities (for a review, see Conway,
Jarrold, Kane, Miyake, & Towse, 2007).
The most commonly used paradigm for measuring work-
ing memory capacity is the complex-span paradigm. There
are several variants of complex span, the earliest being the
reading span (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) and counting
span (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982) tasks, later fol-
lowed by operation span (Turner & Engle, 1989) and spatial
variants of the paradigm (Shah & Miyake, 1996). The
general schema of all complex-span tasks is that encoding
of a list of memoranda (e.g., words, letters) for serial recall
is interleaved with a distracting processing task (e.g., read-
ing a sentence or verifying an equation). The term complex
span has been coined in contrast to simple span, which
refers to immediate serial recall without a parallel distractor
task.
Multiple variants of complex span have been validated as
measures of working memory capacity by the findings that
they correlate well with each other and with other indicators of
working memory capacity (Oberauer et al., 2000; Schmiedek,
Hildebrandt, Lövdén, Wilhelm, & Lindenberger, 2009) and
that they are good predictors of a range of performance
indicators in tasks that are theoretically assumed to require
working memory, such as tests of reasoning and fluid intelli-
gence (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003), text comprehension
(Daneman & Merikle, 1996), and explicit learning of a rule
(Unsworth & Engle, 2005), as well as a number of
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experimental tasks requiring cognitive control, such as the
Stroop task (Kane & Engle, 2003) and the antisaccade task
(Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004). Therefore, understand-
ing the cognitive processes in the complex-span paradigm
would be a fundamental step toward understanding the capac-
ity limits of cognition. The success of complex span as a
measure of working memory capacity has inspired much
experimental work and various theoretical efforts directed at
analyzing the underlying processes (e.g., Barrouillet,
Bernardin, & Camos, 2004; Bayliss, Jarrold, Gunn, &
Baddeley, 2003; Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 1992; Oberauer
& Lewandowsky, 2011; Towse, Hitch, & Hutton, 2000;
Unsworth & Engle, 2007).
With few exceptions, theories of the processes involved in
complex span, like theories of working memory in general,
have so far remained verbal descriptions of mechanisms. This
is problematic because it is generally acknowledged that
working memory is a complex system, and comprehensive
theories of working memory typically assume numerous
mechanisms and processes that operate together (Baddeley,
1986; Cowan, 1995). With theories of such complexity, un-
ambiguously determining predictions for a specific set of
circumstances easily surpasses our human reasoning abilities
(Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010). The problem is often com-
pounded by the vagueness of verbal theories, which leave
many critical details unspecified (for an example, see
Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2011). These problems can be
addressed using computational modeling. Writing a theory
as a computer program forces the theorist to specify the model
in sufficient detail for the program to run. Moreover, running
the program provides a means to derive precise and unambig-
uous predictions from the model. Every single decision on the
way from the general principles of a theory to its detailed
implementation, and every step on the way to its predictions
for a specific experiment, is fully transparent in the program-
ming code.
Computational modeling has been applied fruitfully to one
experimental paradigm of working memory research, the
serial-recall task (Burgess & Hitch, 1999; Farrell &
Lewandowsky, 2002; Henson, 1998b; Page & Norris, 1998).
The goal of the present work is to apply what we have learned
from modeling of serial recall to developing a computational
model of behavior in the complex-span paradigm. This is no
trivial step, because complex span appears to rely on core
cognitive abilities to a far greater extent than does simple span.
For example, even though the surface similarity between
different complex-span tasks (e.g., operation span vs. sentence
span) is far less than the surface similarity between simple-
span tasks from different domains, performance correlates
more highly across domains for the complex-span than for
the simple-span task (Kane et al., 2004). Moreover, because
the complex-span task shares many features with other para-
digms of working memory research—short-term retention of
information, a requirement to retain serial order, distraction by
a concurrent task, and coordination of multiple competing
processes—a computational model of complex span will
serve as a springboard for more precise theorizing in the field
as a whole.
One central theoretical question about working memory
is why it has limited capacity. Many theories explain the
capacity limit by assuming that representations in working
memory quickly decay over time unless they are actively
maintained by rehearsal or refreshing (Baddeley, 1986;
Barrouillet et al., 2004). This assumption has been incorpo-
rated into the only two computational models of complex
span proposed so far (Daily, Lovett, & Reder, 2001;
Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011). The assumption of rapid
time-based decay, however, has been repeatedly questioned
by empirical observations (for a review, see Lewandowsky,
Oberauer, & Brown, 2009). One common alternative to
decay is that working memory capacity is limited by inter-
ference between representations (Jonides et al., 2008;
Nairne, 2002; Saito & Miyake, 2004). To date, however,
the concept of interference has remained underspecified,
thus limiting its theoretical utility (Jonides et al., 2008).
We overcome this limitation here by instantiating the inter-
ference notion in a detailed computational model of com-
plex span.
Our model attributes the capacity limit of working mem-
ory entirely to interference. The model accounts for all of
the findings that provided the initial empirical support for a
decay-based theory of complex span, the time-based
resource-sharing (TBRS) theory of Barrouillet, Camos, and
colleagues (Barrouillet et al., 2004; Barrouillet, Bernardin,
Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos, 2007). The TBRS theory has,
arguably, been the strongest contender for explaining
complex-span performance to date, and therefore we will
compare our new model to a computational implementation
of the TBRS theory (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011).
This article proceeds as follows: We start by presenting
our model—first informally as a set of theoretical assump-
tions, and then formally as a computational instantiation. We
then apply the model to four sets of empirical findings.
These represent benchmark findings from the complex-
span paradigm that should serve as priority targets for mod-
eling. The first is a set of findings concerning the relation
between short-term retention and the temporal parameters of
concurrent processing. These findings provided the empiri-
cal basis for the TBRS theory (Barrouillet et al., 2007;
Barrouillet, Portrat, & Camos, 2011). The second set of
findings represents a detailed analysis of recall errors in
complex span, which has proved highly informative for
models of simple span. The third set of findings concerns
the effects of different kinds of similarity between memory
items and distractors. The fourth set pertains to the pattern of
correlations between span tasks across different domains
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that arises from the study of individual differences. The
model is shown to handle all four sets of findings.
A distributed neural-network model for complex span
Our model is an extension of the SOB (“serial-order-in-a-
box”) model, a distributed neural-network model of serial
recall (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2002). The initial SOB was
an auto-associator in the tradition of the brain-state-in-a-box
(BSB) architecture (Anderson, Silverstein, Ritz, & Jones,
1977), from which the model derived its name. The second
version, called C-SOB (Farrell, 2006; Lewandowsky &
Farrell, 2008b), has a two-layer structure, with one layer
representing serial positions and the other representing items
(the prefix “C” stands for “context,” because the position
representations are a form of context). Both item and posi-
tion representations are distributed—that is, they consist of
patterns of activation across a large number of processing
units in the network. Different items are represented by
different patterns across the same set of units. Thus, item
representations have well-defined similarity relations to
each other, reflected in the similarity of the patterns repre-
senting them; the same holds for positions. Items are
encoded in C-SOB through Hebbian associations between
item and position representations: The first list item is asso-
ciated with the first position representation (a.k.a. a position
marker), the second item is associated with the second
position marker, and so on. Memory for order is maintained
by the patterns of association in the weight matrix that
connects position markers to item representations. The use
of context markers to represent order is a standard tool
among memory theorists and has gained substantial empir-
ical support (Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2008b).
Memory performance is limited because all item-to-
position associations are superimposed in the same weight
matrix, so that at the point of recall the matrix represents
each individual association only in a distorted fashion. One
feature of both SOB and C-SOB, which is at the heart of
much of the models’ predictive power, is that encoding
strength is determined by an item’s novelty. Novelty is
assessed by computing an expectation for each incoming
item, on the basis of already-encoded memories, and deter-
mining the similarity between this expectation and the actual
item. The more novel the incoming item is, the more strong-
ly it is encoded. This process of assessing novelty to deter-
mine an item’s encoding strength is termed “novelty-gated
encoding.” The assumption of novelty-gated encoding has
been part of SOB since its inception, and has received
independent empirical support (Farrell & Lewandowsky,
2003).
Our new model, SOB-CS (CS for “complex span”),
builds directly on C-SOB (Farrell, 2006; Lewandowsky &
Farrell, 2008b), maintaining its original theoretical principles
but slightly updating its mathematical formalization (see
Electronic SupplementaryMaterial for an explanation of these
technical details). In addition, SOB-CS incorporates two fur-
ther theoretical assumptions whose introduction was necessi-
tated by the presence of distractors in the complex-span task.
First, we assume that processing a distractor, such as
reading a word or carrying out an arithmetic operation,
inevitably results in the encoding of a representation of the
distractor into working memory in the same way as the
memoranda (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008). There is
considerable precedent in the literature for this assumption
(e.g., Logan, 1988). Therefore, distractors create interfer-
ence with encoded item representations. Novelty-gated
encoding applies to distractors in the same way that it
applies to items, so that repeatedly processing the same
distractor incurs less interference than does processing dif-
ferent distractors.
Second, like most models of working memory, ours
assumes that the system engages in active restoration of an
unimpaired memory state when time allows. This assump-
tion is motivated by the finding that memory performance in
complex span is better when distractor operations are
demanded at a slower pace, leaving more free time between
each distractor and the next stimulus (Barrouillet et al.,
2004; Barrouillet et al., 2007). Whereas in decay-based
models, active restoration typically refers to boosting
decayed traces up to their original strength (by some sort
of rehearsal or refreshing mechanism), active restoration
must be conceptualized differently in interference-based
models. When the main limiting factor for performance is
interference, active restoration must reduce the impact of
interference. This can be accomplished in several ways. For
reasons of parsimony, we have so far implemented only one
of them in SOB-CS, by applying a mechanism that is
already embodied in all SOB models to date—namely, the
removal of interfering material from memory, which by
implication restores the quality of earlier memories.
Because the removal notion is central to SOB-CS, it
deserves to be placed into a broader theoretical context.
One general theoretical insight that emerged from our
modeling work is that a successful model must have a
mechanism for clearing working memory of no-longer-
relevant contents. Without this, the system would soon be
overloaded with outdated material. For example, when men-
tally solving an expression such as “24 × 3,” it would be
inopportune to retain “3” in working memory during the
final step of adding “12” to “60”—even though the concept
“3” necessarily had to be brought to mind a brief moment
before in order to compute “12.” In general, rapid updating
of working memory would be impossible without a clearing
or removal mechanism, because the system would soon be
choked by proactive interference, and demonstrably, this
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does not happen (Kessler & Meiran, 2008; Oberauer &
Vockenberg, 2009).
In decay-based models, removal of old contents from mem-
ory occurs by default (viz., they simply fade away), and active
maintenance must be engaged to retain contents that are still
relevant. Interference-based models operate by the reverse
logic: All contents are maintained by default, and active re-
moval is necessary to remove those that are no longer relevant.
Thus, whereas decay-based models must be equipped with a
mechanism for active maintenance, interference-based models
must include a mechanism for active removal.
This necessary link between interference and removal has
been largely ignored in the literature (for an exception, see
Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999). SOB-CS provides a precise
mechanism explaining how removal is accomplished when-
ever there is free time in-between distractor operations—for
example, during a pause between solving a distracting equa-
tion and presentation of the subsequent memorandum.
During those pauses, the immediately preceding distractor
representation is gradually removed from memory using
Hebbian antilearning. This operation gradually undoes the
association between the distractor and the position marker
(see Kessler & Meiran, 2008, for the related idea of “dis-
mantling” outdated bindings in an updating task).
The assumption of distractor removal (or “unbinding”) is a
generalization of an assumption that is common in models of
serial recall: Once a list item is recalled, it is removed from
memory to avoid perseveration. There is strong evidence to
support such a mechanism for response suppression (Farrell &
Lewandowsky, 2004; Henson, 1998a), and it has been imple-
mented in many models of serial recall (G. D. A. Brown,
Preece, & Hulme, 2000; Burgess & Hitch, 1999; Page &
Norris, 1998). In all versions of SOB, response suppression
has been modeled using the mechanism of Hebbian antilearn-
ing. Accordingly, response suppression is an instance of re-
moving no-longer-relevant information from memory. Here,
we simply generalize this notion to distractors.
By specifying how information is removed from working
memory, we flesh out one basic operation for controlling the
contents of memory. Control over which information is held
in working memory is being recognized as an important
source of individual differences in working memory capac-
ity (Hasher et al., 1999; Jost, Bryck, Vogel, & Mayr, 2010;
Vogel, McCollough, & Machizawa, 2005). Explicitly mod-
eling the control processes operating on the contents of
working memory is a prerequisite for understanding why
working memory capacity also correlates with various con-
trol processes in tasks with little involvement of memory
(Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 2007).
To summarize, strong conceptual considerations mandate
the presence of some control process that can clear working
memory of unwanted contents. The removal notion is sup-
ported by data and theoretical precedent, and in SOB-CS we
instantiate the removal process using a mechanism of prov-
en theoretical utility.
In SOB-CS, removal of distractors plays a role similar to
that of rehearsal or refreshing of memory items in other
theories. Our model does not presently include a mainte-
nance process for the strengthening of items (e.g., rehearsal
or refreshing), for three reasons. First, rehearsal or refresh-
ing are necessary mechanisms of maintenance when mem-
ory traces are assumed to decay over time; however, in a
model that attributes forgetting to interference, the threat to
remembering comes from the presence of interfering mate-
rial, not from the decay of memoranda, and therefore, the
most effective way of protecting memory is to remove the
sources of interference. Second, the existing evidence does
not yield strong support for a causal role of rehearsal in
complex-span tasks. While there is no doubt about the
existence of articulatory rehearsal, the evidence for it being
causally responsible for superior memory performance is
less than compelling. For example, people who report using
articulatory rehearsal in a complex-span task do not perform
much better than those who report just reading the memory
items as their strategy, and more effective strategies, such as
elaboration, are reported by only a minority of participants
(Dunlosky & Kane, 2007; Kaakinen & Hyönä, 2007). Third,
as we show below, we have successfully modeled bench-
mark findings cited in support of refreshing without actually
requiring the refreshing of memory items, and we therefore
have omitted that mechanism for reasons of parsimony.
We remain open to the possibility that a rehearsal or
refreshing mechanism might become necessary in a future
extension of the model, if new results become available that
mandate its inclusion. To summarize this crucial point: We
do not claim that people do not rehearse during complex-
span tasks. The existence of rehearsal is beyond dispute. We
also do not rule out the possibility that rehearsal benefits
memory; however, the evidence to date has turned out to be
inconclusive upon closer inspection. What we demonstrate
in the remainder of this article is that rehearsal is not needed
to account for benchmark data in complex span.
In addition to the two new assumptions just discussed, we
make explicit two hitherto tacit assumptions in SOB. First,
previous versions of SOB have—for simplicity—modeled
basic processes as time invariant, on the basis that in all
paradigms to which the theory has been applied to date,
sufficient time was available for processes to run to com-
pletion. Under those circumstances, the theory could leave
temporal aspects of those processes unspecified for parsi-
mony’s sake. By contrast, in SOB-CS, we must explicitly
model the time dependence of encoding and retrieval pro-
cesses because, in complex span, performance is strongly
influenced by temporal parameters (Barrouillet et al., 2004).
In particular, we make the uncontroversial assumption that
the degree of encoding and the extent of removal of stimuli
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increases up to a point, as more time is available to those
processes. There is considerable evidence that encoding into
short-term memory takes time to be accomplished (Jolicœur
& Dell’Acqua, 1998). Likewise, there is evidence that re-
moval of information from working memory takes time
(Oberauer, 2001).
Second, we make explicit the notion of a focus of atten-
tion in SOB-CS. The last stimulus encoded into working
memory, or the last item manipulated, typically enjoys a
privileged status of heightened availability (Garavan, 1998;
McElree, 2006; Oberauer, 2003a), supporting the notion
that, by default, the last representation operated upon
remains in the system’s focus of attention. In SOB-CS, as
in other distributed neural-network models, there is at any
point in time a pattern of activation in each layer of units
that (more-or-less accurately) represents an event (i.e., an
item or a distractor in a specific position). We regard this
currently active representation as the content of the focus of
attention. The active representations in the focus of attention
are those that are available for processes such as encoding
(through Hebbian learning) and removal (through Hebbian
antilearning, as explained below). By default, the last-
presented stimulus (item or distractor), together with its
serial position, is in the focus of attention, and thereby the
association between that stimulus and its position can be
encoded or removed.
The following sections present SOB-CS formally. To
facilitate exposition, the variables used in the equations
and their roles in the model are summarized in Table 1.
The MATLAB model code is available as Supplementary
Materials for this article.1
Architecture and representations
SOB-CS consists of two layers of units that are fully
interconnected by a weight matrix W. The item layer, with
150 units, represents items; the position layer, comprising
16 units, represents the serial positions in the current list.
Items are represented by vectors of +1 and –1, constructed at
random in accordance with constraints on their similarity
structure. Position markers are constant vectors of values
between –1 and +1, constructed such that their similarity
reflects their ordinal relation. The similarity between any
two position markers (expressed as their cosine) decreases
exponentially with their absolute ordinal distance:
cos pi; pj
 
¼ sp ijj jð Þ; ð1Þ
where i and j are the positions of the ith and jth items, pi and
pj are vectors representing positional markers at those
positions, and sp is a fixed parameter determining the degree
of overlap of successive positional markers (sp 0 .5 through-
out, as in Farrell, 2006, and Oberauer & Lewandowsky,
2008).2
Whereas position markers are shared by all tasks requiring
memory for serial order, the representations of stimuli depend
on the category of items and the distractors involved in a task.
We constructed representations for four categories of stimuli
used in the experiments that we simulated: letters, digits,
words, and generic visuospatial stimuli, each of which can
serve as memory items or as distractors. For letters, we used
the representations of 16 consonants (six similar and ten dis-
similar) constructed by Farrell (2006) and Lewandowsky and
Farrell (2008a) for use with C-SOB. The similarity structure
between these 16 vectors reflects a three-dimensional multidi-
mensional scaling solution for an empirical confusion matrix
between these letters (Hull, 1973). The average similarity
between consonant representations, computed as their cosine,
was .65 for the similar and .50 for the dissimilar subsets.
Nine vectors were constructed to represent digits. These
were created from a common prototype such that their
average similarity was .50; this value reflects the fact that
digits are, on average, less confusable than letters (Jacobs,
1887). Finally, we created nine sets of nine words each. The
words within each set were similar to each other (cosine 0
.65), and words from different sets were dissimilar (cosine 0
.5). For simulations of experiments not manipulating simi-
larity, we used a random mixture of similar and dissimilar
letters or words for all memory lists and distractor sets.
Visuospatial stimuli (used in Simulations 5 and 6) were
generated in the same way as the words, except that they
are represented in a separate section of the item layer.
Distractor representations were created in the same way as
the item representations—that is, by sampling individual dis-
tractors from a distractor prototype. For simulations in which
items and distractors came from the same broad category (i.e.,
digits, letters, or words), we used the same prototype for
generating both items and distractors, so that the average
similarity between an item and a distractor equaled that be-
tween two items and between two distractors. For simulations
in which the items and distractors came from different catego-
ries, we derived the prototype of the distractors from the
prototype of the items, so that they had a similarity governed
by the item–distractor similarity parameter sc, which was set to
.35, the same value as in previous simulations (Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2008).3
1 The program code is also available at our web pages: www.cogsciwa.
com; www.psychologie.uzh.ch/fachrichtungen/allgpsy/Team/
Oberauer_en.html; http://seis.bris.ac.uk/~pssaf/publications.html.
2 The similarity between neighboring positions was labeled tc in pre-
vious publications; here we rename it to sp to avoid confusion with the
time parameters.
3 The actual similarity between items and distractors is lower (e.g.,
about 0.1 in the case of letters and digits) because items are derived
from the item prototype and distractors are derived from the distractor
prototype.
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Encoding and recall
Figure 1 provides a schematic illustration of the encoding
process in SOB-CS. Each presented memory item activates
its representation in the item layer, and at the same time, the
representation of the next available list position is activated
in the position layer. The representations active in the item
layer and the position layer jointly constitute the current
focus of attention. Encoding into working memory occurs
by associating the item representation with the position
representation in the focus. Once associative encoding is
completed, that item–position pair is replaced in the focus
by the next item–position pair. Encoding uses standard
Hebbian learning (see, e.g., Anderson, 1995):
$W ¼ ηeðiÞvipiT ; ð2Þ
where W is the weight matrix connecting the position layer
to the item layer, vi is the vector representing the ith pre-
sented item, and pi is the positional marker for the ith serial
position, which is transposed for computing the outer prod-
uct of the two vectors.
We model encoding as a time-dependent process: The
encoding strength ηe for the ith item, ηe(i), is calculated as a
function of the time spent encoding the item:
ηeðiÞ ¼ AðiÞ 1 exp teRð Þð Þ; ð3Þ
where Α(i) is the asymptote of the encoding strength of item
i, R is the rate of encoding, and te is the time spent on
encoding. Thus, the encoding strength ηe that determines
the strength of Hebbian association is assumed to grow
toward asymptote at an encoding rate of R. The asymptote
itself is a function of the novelty of the incoming item,
which is defined as the energy between the to-be-learned
association and the information captured by W up to that
point. Specifically, the asymptote A(i) for the encoding
strength of item i is a logistic function of that item’s energy,
Ei:
AðiÞ ¼ 1
1þ expððEi  eÞgÞ ; ð4Þ
where e and g are the threshold and gain parameters, re-
spectively, of the logistic function. For all simulations, e was
set to –1,000 and g to 0.0033. Simulations of simple span
have shown that these values generate the highest level of
memory accuracy without producing empirically unrealistic
serial-position curves. The use of a logistic function smoothly
restricts A(i) to fall between zero and unity, thus preventing the
occurrence of implausible (e.g., <0) encoding weights.
Constraining encoding strength in this way represents an
improvement over previous instantiations of the model, in
Table 1 Definition of variables in SOB-CS
Symbol Role Description
pi Representation Vector representing list position i
vi Representation Vector representing list item i
vi' Representation Vector retrieved when weight
matrix is cued with pi
dj,k Representation Vector representing distractor k
following list item j
W Representation Weight matrix connecting item
layer and position layer
sp Fixed parameter Similarity between neighboring
positions
sdis Fixed parameter Similarity between dissimilar
list items
ssim Fixed parameter Similarity between similar list items
sc Fixed parameter Similarity between item prototype
and distractor prototype
R Free parameter Encoding rate for memory items
and distractors
r Free parameter Removal rate for memory items
and distractors
e Free parameter Threshold for logistic function
transforming energy into
encoding strength
g Free parameter Gain for logistic function
transforming energy into
encoding strength
No Free parameter Output interference: Noise added to
weight matrix after each recall event
c Free parameter Discriminability between recall
candidates (0 steepness with which
similarity falls off with Euclidean
distance from retrieved vector)
Ei; Ej,k Computed
values
Energy of item i; Energy of distractor
k following item j
A(i); A(j, k) Computed
values
Asymptotic encoding strength of item
i and of distractor k after item j,
respectively
Ω(i); Ω(j, k) Computed
values
Asymptotic strength of antilearning
for item i and for distractor k after
item j, respectively
ηe(i) Computed value Encoding strength for encoding item
i, computed from A(i), te, and R
ηe(j, k) Computed value Encoding strength for encoding
distractor k following item j,
computed from A(j, k), td, and R
ηs(i) Computed value Antilearning strength for removing
item i, computed from Ω(i), ts, and r
ηs(j, k) Computed value Antilearning strength for removing
distractor dj,k, computed from
Ω(j, k), ts, and r
te Estimated
variable
Time spent attending to, and thereby
encoding, an item
td Estimated
variable
Time spent attending to, and
thereby encoding, a distractor
ts Estimated
variable
Time spent removing an item or
distractor
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which the encoding strength was not bounded, without altering
the basic principle of energy-gated encoding.
The energy of the ith association is given by
Ei ¼ viTWpi: ð5Þ
(see Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2008b). The computation of
energy can be interpreted as the generation of an expectation
for the item in position i, given the current state of memory
as reflected in the state of the weight matrix before encoding
of item i. The expectation is computed by cueing the weight
matrix W with the new position pi. Energy is the negative
dot product between the expectation (computed asWpi) and
the actual item vi, and it reflects the degree of mismatch
between the expectation and the actual item—that is, the
item’s novelty. Equation 4 implies that more novel items,
which have less negative (or even positive) energy values,
are encoded more strongly. The use of energy to compute
the weighting of incoming information is a core principle of
SOB that turns out to be critical for the model’s predictions
for complex span. Recent research on the processing of
novelty in the hippocampus lends support to a mechanism
very similar to the one assumed for SOB-CS (Kumaran &
Maguire, 2007).
Our computation of encoding strength in SOB-CS differs
from previous instantiations of SOB in that it makes encod-
ing strength time-dependent. The duration of encoding an
item into working memory can be estimated from dual-task
studies (Jolicœur & Dell’Acqua, 1998) and from studies
using masked presentation of visual stimuli (Vogel,
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Fig. 1 Schematic illustration of encoding in SOB-CS. Top left panel:
State of the weight matrix after encoding stimulus i – 1,Wi–1. The new
position vector pi is activated in the position layer, and its activation is
forwarded through Wi–1 to generate an expectation (0 Wi–1 pi) for the
incoming stimulus in the item layer. Activation values of the units in
the position and item layers are coded by shade (white 0 –1, gray 0 0,
black 0 1). A new stimulus, represented by vector vi, is initially
matched against the expected vector. The degree of match is measured
as energy Ei. Top right panel: Energy Ei is translated into the asymptote
of encoding strength, A, by the logistic function, governed by free
parameters e and g. Parameter e is the point on the Ei scale at which A 0
0.5 (illustrated by the dotted line), and parameter g determines the
steepness of the function around that point. The dashed line shows
the resulting A for a stimulus with Ei 0 –300. Bottom left panel:
Encoding strength ηe for encoding stimulus i is computed as a
negatively accelerated exponential function of the time t spent on
encoding. The dotted line shows the resulting encoding strength
for an item encoded for 1.5 s; the dashed line shows encoding
strength for a distractor encoded for 0.3 s. Bottom right panel:
Updating of the weight matrix according to the outer product of
the position representation pi
T and the item representation vi,
multiplied by the encoding strength ηe. Bold lines are the con-
nection weights increased in this learning event because they
connect units with same-signed activation. Thin lines are connec-
tion weights that are decreased because they connect units with
opposite-signed activation
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Woodman, & Luck, 2006). These studies converge on an
estimate of 150–300 ms as the average time for encoding an
item into working memory. Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua ap-
plied a formal model to three of their experiments, from
which we estimated the encoding rate for individual letters
to be about six items per second.4 We therefore set the
encoding rate to R 0 6 in Eq. 3. This value implies that
ηe(i) reaches 95 % of its asymptote after 500 ms. Thus, with
encoding times of 500 ms or more, encoding in SOB-CS is
virtually indistinguishable from encoding in previous ver-
sions of C-SOB, and Eq. 3 functionally reduces to the
simple equality ηe(i) 0 A(i) that—bar the use of a logistic
squashing function—is familiar from earlier applications of
C-SOB.
Retrieval proceeds by reinstating the position markers
in their original order, one by one, as cues for the items
with which they were associated. For position i, retriev-
al is cued by presenting the activation pattern for posi-
tional marker pi in the position layer and updating the
activation in the item layer by forwarding activation
through the weight matrix:
vi
0 ¼ Wpi; ð6Þ
where the resultant vector in the item layer, vi', is a
distorted version of the original item vector vi, consist-
ing of a blend of vi and the other item representations
involved in the trial, which will all have been associated
to partially overlapping positional markers. To determine
which item to recall, the retrieved vector vi' is matched
to all vectors vj of known retrieval candidates in long-
term memory. The similarity of vi' to each retrieval
candidate is computed as
s vi
0
; vj
 
¼ exp cD vi 0 ; vj
 2 
: ð7Þ
In this equation, the Euclidean distance measure D is
weighted by the free parameter c, which determines the
discriminability between retrieval candidates. With larger
values of c, similarity falls off more steeply with distance,
so that the most similar retrieval candidate is more clearly
discriminated from the less similar ones. For computational
reasons, D is normalized by subtracting the minimum dis-
tance across all of the n retrieval candidates from the dis-
tance for each candidate.
The probability of recalling an item j is computed from
these similarities by the Luce choice rule:
PðvjÞ ¼ sðvi
0
; vjÞPn
k¼1
s vi
0 ; vkð Þ
; ð8Þ
where n is the number of retrieval candidates. A candidate is
then selected for recall by random sampling among the
candidate set, with the probability of sampling for each
candidate being determined by Eq. 8. The intact representa-
tion of the candidate selected for output, vo,i, replaces the
originally retrieved vector vi', thus placing a clearly identi-
fied retrieval candidate into the focus of attention. Figure 2
provides an illustration of retrieval in SOB-CS.
The set of recall candidates includes not only the list items
but also other items in the experimental vocabulary. This
enables the model to generate extralist intrusion errors.
When the distractors come from the same stimulus category
as the items (e.g., both are words), we assume that the dis-
tractors are also included in the candidate set, so that intru-
sions of distractors in recall can be modeled. (When
distractors are categorically different from the memoranda,
they are excluded from the set of candidates because people
can prevent intrusions on the basis of categorical information.)
Overt recall itself impairs memory for the remaining
items; this effect is known as output interference (Cowan,
Saults, Elliott, & Moreno, 2002; Fitzgerald & Broadbent,
1985; Oberauer, 2003b). In SOB-CS, as in C-SOB, we
implemented output interference by adding Gaussian noise
with a standard deviation No to each weight inW after recall
of each item.
A common assumption in models of serial recall is that
recalled items are suppressed in order to avoid persevera-
tion. Response suppression has been modeled in SOB by
Hebbian antilearning (Anderson, 1991). Hebbian antilearn-
ing operates in the same way as Hebbian learning, except
that a negative encoding strength is used. The negative sign
implies that the association between the recalled item, vo,j,
and its position is removed from the weight matrix:
ΔW ¼ ηsð jÞvo; jpjT ; ð9Þ
where j is the output position and ηs( j) is the strength of
suppression at output position j.
4 Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua (1998) fitted a model to the data of three of
their experiments. In that model one parameter, τ1
i, is the mean of an
exponentially distributed time variable that represents the sum of the
times for sensory and perceptual processing and for short-term consol-
idation of a single item. These means were estimated to be 0.304,
0.150, and 0.275 s for the three modeled experiments (4, 6, and 7),
respectively. The rate of the exponential function is the inverse of the
mean: that is, 3.3, 6.7, and 3.6, respectively, for the three experiments.
The rate is higher for Experiment 6 than for the other experiments, and
Jolicœur and Dell’Acqua argued that this could be because in
Experiment 6, a single letter was to be encoded into memory on every
trial, whereas the other experiments involved a mixture of trials with
one and with three letters. In this regard, Experiment 6 might be the
most representative one for the encoding of single letters in a serial-
recall task.
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Like Hebbian learning during encoding, Hebbian anti-
learning during response suppression takes time, and SOB-
CS explicitly represents this. Therefore, the antilearning
strength of suppression, ηs( j), is a function of time:
ηsðjÞ ¼ Ωð jÞ 1 exp tsrð Þð Þ; ð10Þ
where ts is the time devoted to response suppression of item
j (set to 1s for all simulations, the approximate duration of
serial recall of letters; Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2004, Exp. 2),
and r is the rate of removal of representations from working
memory. Ω(j) is the asymptotic value of antilearning strength,
computed by a logistic function from the item’s energy:
Ωð jÞ ¼ 1
1þ exp  EjE1
  ; ð11Þ
where Ej is the just-recalled item’s energy and E1 is the energy
of the item recalled at the first output position. Dividing
by E1 corrects for the overall energy of the list. That is,
when more items are stored, or positional markers over-
lap more, the energy computed during recall will on
average be higher, and dividing by E1 effectively uses
the energy of the first item to correct for this potential
variability. For the first output position, a default value
Ω(j) 0 1 is used. The energy of the recalled item j is
computed using the same formula as Eq. 5, but with the
presented item replaced by the recalled item:
Ej ¼ vo; jTWjpj: ð12Þ
Distractor encoding and removal
Following our previous work (Oberauer & Lewandowsky,
2008), we assume that all distractors are associated with the
position of the immediately preceding item. That item’s
position is still held in the focus of attention because
position representations are updated only when a new mem-
ory item is presented. Distractors are represented in the same
way as items, as random vectors of –1 and +1 generated
according to the category of stimuli (digits, consonants, or
words), as described earlier. Processing of a distractor
implies activating that distractor in the focus of attention,
upon which Hebbian learning automatically associates it
with the currently active position marker, using the same
mechanism as for the learning of list items (Eq. 2):
ΔW ¼ηeð j; kÞdj;kpjT ; ð13Þ
where W is the weight matrix, dj,k is the vector representing
distractor k following item j, pj is the position marker of
position j, and ηe(j, k) is the encoding strength of the dis-
tractor. The asymptotic encoding strength of the kth distrac-
tor following item j is computed, like that of an item, as a
logistic function of its energy:
A j; kð Þ ¼ 1
1þ exp  Ej;k  e
 
g
  : ð14Þ
The energy of every distractor k following item j, Ej,k, is
computed as before, according to Eq. 5, using the position
representation of the preceding item, pj. Because distractors
are associated with positions already occupied by an item,
and because all representations within a content domain are
at least moderately positively correlated, distractors are typ-
ically encoded with less strength than are items, because of
energy-gated encoding. Like encoding of items, encoding of
distractors is a process that takes time, such that the encod-
ing strength increases with the duration of distractor encod-
ing, td:
ηe j; kð Þ ¼ A j; kð Þ 1 exp tdRð Þð Þ: ð15Þ
c
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Fig. 2 Schematic illustration of
retrieval in SOB-CS. Left pan-
el: The positional cue pi is
activated in the position layer
and forwards its activation
through the weight matrix W to
the item layer, creating an
approximation of the item vec-
tor, vi′. This vector is compared
to all vectors of retrieval candi-
dates, and their distance
D(vi′, vj) is computed for all
retrieval candidates. Right pan-
el: Distance is converted into
similarity by a Gaussian gradi-
ent. Three gradients are shown,
for the three values of c used in
different simulations in this
article
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The distractor is encoded while attention is devoted to it
(Phaf & Wolters, 1993). Like items, distractors reach near-
asymptotic encoding strength after about 500 ms.
As noted earlier, any free time during complex-span
processing is used to remove the immediately preceding
distractor, using the same mechanism of Hebbian antilearn-
ing introduced above for response suppression:
ΔW ¼ ηr j; kð Þd j;kpjT ; ð16Þ
where ηr( j, k) is the antilearning strength for distractor
dj,k, which is the kth distractor following the item in
position j. Removal is a gradual process that, as compared to
encoding, proceeds relatively slowly. Therefore, the strength of
antilearning is computed as a function of the available free
time, tf, and the asymptotic removal strength of the distractor,
Ω( j, k):
ηr j; kð Þ ¼ Ω j; kð Þ 1 exp tf r
  
; ð17Þ
where r is the rate of removal, which also governs the rate of
response suppression (Eq. 10). The asymptote of removal
strength is computed in the same way as the strength of
response suppression:
Ω j; kð Þ ¼ 1
1þ exp  Ej;kE1;1
  ; ð18Þ
where E1,1 is the energy of the first distractor in the first
processing episode. For the first distractor in a trial,Ω(1, 1) 0 1.
Estimates from experiments in which participants were
instructed to (temporarily or permanently) remove part of
the contents of working memory have shown that removal
takes between 1 and 2 s (Oberauer, 2001, 2002). Therefore,
we set r to 1.5, which implies that the rate of antilearning for
removal has reached 95 % of its asymptote Ω( j, k) after 2 s.
To summarize, SOB-CS has four fixed parameters and
six free parameters (see Table 1). We regard as fixed param-
eters those that were treated as fixed parameters in previous
versions of C-SOB and whose values we did not change;
they all pertain to the similarity between representations. We
regard as free parameters those that we adjusted manually—
either on the basis of independent evidence, as in the case of
the rate parameters for encoding and removal, or to find
values that generated good model fits to the benchmark data.
We set the free parameters to the same values in all simu-
lations reported in this article, except in a few cases, which
will be explicitly noted: the threshold and gain parameters of
the logistic function that translates energy into encoding
strength, e 0 –1,000 and g 0 0.0033; the encoding rate,
R 0 6; the removal rate, r 0 1.5; the confusability parameter
for items during retrieval, c 0 1.3; and the output interfer-
ence parameter, No 0 1.5.
Beforemoving on to describe the application of SOB-CS to
data from the complex-span paradigm, we first will briefly
summarize an alternative account of complex-span perfor-
mance, TBRS* (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011), as that
model serves as an important baseline for assessing SOB-CS’s
account of several key phenomena.
An alternative theory: The time-based resource-sharing
(TBRS) model
A new model must at the very least explain the data that
constitute the main empirical support for extant theories and
models. One contender for explaining performance in com-
plex span is the time-based resource-sharing (TBRS) theory
(Barrouillet et al., 2004), which has recently been instanti-
ated in a computational model, TBRS* (Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2011). TBRS* is the most sophisticated
implementation yet of two popular assumptions about work-
ing memory: that memory traces decay rapidly over time,
and that decay can be prevented by some form of active
maintenance (i.e., rehearsal or refreshing). It is clear from
the foregoing discussion that those assumptions stand in
diametric opposition to the architecture of SOB-CS. Our
first goal in this article is therefore to demonstrate that
SOB-CS can explain the key phenomena cited in support
of TBRS and TBRS* without committing to the core
assumptions of the TBRS theory. Here, we summarize the
TBRS theory and the key findings in its support.
The TBRS theory rests on two basic assumptions:
First, forgetting is driven by time-based decay, and this
decay must be offset by reactivation or refreshing of
items to prevent loss of that information. Second, work-
ing memory has at its disposal a general attentional
mechanism that can be devoted to only one task at a
time. In the complex-span paradigm, this mechanism
must engage with the distracting processing demands
in-between encoding items. However, attention can rap-
idly switch between processing operations (e.g., carrying
out an addition in an operation span task) and refresh-
ing memory items, thereby using even small temporal
gaps between individual operations to carry out refresh-
ing. As a consequence, the model predicts that memory
performance will decline with increasing time during
which attention is occupied by distractor processing,
and that it will improve with increasing free time that
can be devoted to refreshing. These predictions can be
summarized by the concept of cognitive load, defined as
the proportion of available processing time between two
memory items during which attention is captured by the
distractor task:
CL ¼ aN T= ; ð19Þ
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with N representing the number of operations in a
processing episode, a the time demand of each individ-
ual operation, and T the total time available for that
processing episode. The TBRS theory predicts that
memory is a monotonically declining function of in-
creasing cognitive load, as less time is proportionally
available for refreshing items. Additionally, when cog-
nitive load is held constant, Barrouillet et al. (2004)
predicted that the number of distractor operations would
have no effect on memory.
To test these predictions, Barrouillet, Camos, and their
colleagues developed a version of the complex-span para-
digm that increases experimental control over participants’
scheduling of individual processing steps in the task
(Barrouillet et al., 2004; Barrouillet et al., 2007). Following
presentation of each memory item, participants work through
a computer-paced sequence of processing steps (e.g., reading
aloud a digit or making a speeded choice judgment). Figure 3
shows the schematic flow of events in this version of com-
plex span. Presentation of each item is followed by a pro-
cessing episode of fixed duration T, which is broken down
into N processing steps. In each processing step, a relatively
elementary cognitive operation is carried out on a distractor
stimulus (e.g., reading a word, carrying out an arithmetic
operation, or classifying a stimulus by a keypress). This
operation is assumed to capture central attention for duration
a. The remainder of the available time during each processing
step is free time that, according to the TBRS theory, is used for
refreshing memory traces.
Experiments within this paradigm have revealed three
consistent regularities that lend support to the cognitive-
load equation: First, memory performance decreases as the
pace at which processing steps are required increases
(Barrouillet et al., 2004; Barrouillet et al., 2007). This effect
has been found across a large variety of memory materials
and distractor tasks (Hudjetz & Oberauer, 2007; Vergauwe,
Barrouillet, & Camos, 2010), and with children as well as
adults (Barrouillet, Gavens, Vergauwe, Gaillard, & Camos,
2009; Portrat, Camos, & Barrouillet, 2009). In terms of the
cognitive-load equation, increasing the pace means increas-
ing the ratio of aN to T by increasing N, reducing T, or both.
Second, when pace is held constant and the time demand
of individual operations is increased by making the opera-
tions more difficult, memory suffers (Barrouillet et al.,
2007). This is predicted by the theory because increasing
the time demand a while holding the ratio of N and T
Item 1
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Distr. 1.4
Distr. 1.2
Distr. 1.3
Item 2
Distr 2.1
Distr 2.4
Distr 2.2
Distr 2.3
Presentation time
Operation duration (a)
Free time
Processing 
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Total time (T)
Fig. 3 Schematic flow of
events of the complex-span
paradigm of Barrouillet et al.
(2004). Presentation of each
memory item is followed by a
processing episode that consists
of a computer-paced series of
distractor stimuli, each
demanding a response,
followed by a free-time interval
until the onset of the next
distractor. Operation duration
refers to the time for which
generation of a response to a
distractor captures the central
attentional mechanism, which is
not directly observable but can
be approximately inferred from
response latencies. Cognitive
load is defined as aN/T, where
N is the number of distractors in
a processing episode, a is the
operation duration, and T is the
total time
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constant increases cognitive load. Figure 4 illustrates the
first two effects: Memory span declined as the pace of
the processing task was increased, and span was lower for the
processing task with longer response times overall (i.e., the
parity judgment task).
Third, when the pace and the time demands of individual
operations are held constant, increasing the number of oper-
ations following each memory item—and, hence, the total
duration for each processing episode—has often been found
to leave memory performance unaffected (Barrouillet et al.,
2004; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008). This is predicted
by the cognitive-load equation: Increasing the number of
operations at a constant pace means increasing both N and T
by the same proportion, so cognitive load is unchanged.
This third finding, however, needs to be qualified: In a series
of experiments using word reading as the distractor task, we
varied the number of distractor words to be read aloud after
each memory item. If the same word was repeated four
times, memory was as good as when reading a single word,
but when three different distractor words followed each
item, additional forgetting was observed (Lewandowsky,
Geiger, Morrell, & Oberauer, 2010).
In sum, the TBRS theory and its computational imple-
mentation, TBRS*, currently offer the strongest alternative
account to SOB-CS for explaining key experimental results
from the complex-span paradigm. We therefore regard the
findings that provided initial crucial support for TBRS as the
first set of benchmark results that our new model needs to
explain.
Complex span: Benchmark findings and new predictions
There are no established criteria for what constitutes a
benchmark finding in a field. This is an unfortunate situa-
tion, because it enables theorists to focus on those results
that their preferred model handles best. To rein in this
opportunistic selection of phenomena, we here state our
selection criteria explicitly. We argue that benchmark find-
ings should meet two criteria: (1) They should be theoreti-
cally informative; that is, they should count as support for,
or a challenge to, the most successful theories in the field.
(2) They should be robust; that is, they should be replicable
across variations of theoretically unimportant features of
method and materials. The findings that we selected as
benchmarks for a model of complex span, summarized in
Table 2, meet both of these criteria.
The benchmarks and the accompanying new predictions
can be grouped into four sets. The first set consists of effects
related to the interplay between short-term retention and
processing, which is a longstanding topic of research and
theorizing on working memory (Bayliss et al., 2003; Case et
al., 1982; Towse et al., 2000). These are the effects that
constitute the empirical support for the TBRS, described
above. The second set consists of serial-position curves,
error patterns, and transposition gradients. These are find-
ings that, although given relatively little attention so far in
the working memory literature, have been important in
constraining models of serial recall. The third set pertains
to the effects of similarity between memory items and
Fig. 4 Effect of cognitive load
on memory span. Participants
remembered consonants and
carried out one of two distractor
tasks (parity judgment or
location judgments) that
differed in their mean response
times. Pace was manipulated by
demanding 4, 6, and
8 judgments within a constant
total time of 6.4 s. From “Time
and Cognitive Load in Working
Memory,” by P. Barrouillet, S.
Bernardin, S. Portrat, E.
Vergauwe, and V. Camos, 2007,
Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 33, pp.
570–585. Copyright 2007 by
the American Psychological
Association. Reproduced with
permission p. 577
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distractors. These similarity effects are diagnostic for the
mechanisms of interference in working memory. We test
a new prediction arising from the assumptions in SOB-
CS about the interference between items and distractors,
and address the longstanding question of whether the
disruption of immediate memory (“storage”) by distrac-
tor processing is domain-general or domain-specific.
The fourth set concerns individual differences, which
have been a major topic of research with the complex-
span task. One of the reasons that so much interest has
focused on complex span (and other working memory
tasks) is that 50 % of the variance in working memory
capacity across individuals is shared with measures of
fluid intelligence (Conway et al., 2003). In addition,
there has been considerable interest in the patterns of
correlations between simple-span and complex-span
tasks; we focus on those correlations because they fall within
the scope of SOB-CS. In the remainder of this article, we will
report the simulations through which we applied SOB-CS to
these four groups of benchmark findings and present new
model predictions, together with data testing them.
Cognitive load and the number of operations
The cognitive-load effect (Barrouillet et al., 2004) is an
important regularity concerning the interplay between mem-
ory and processing in working memory. It implies that
whereas the processing of distractors impairs memory, more
generous intervals of free time between individual process-
ing steps can be used to restore memory. The TBRS theory
(Barrouillet et al., 2004) identifies decay as the cause of
forgetting during processing operations, and refreshing as
the beneficial force in the free intervals between operations.
In contrast, SOB-CS assumes that distractor processing
damages memory via the interference introduced from dis-
tractor representations entering working memory (Eqs. 13–
15), and that the beneficial effect of free time arises from the
gradual removal of distractor representations in-between pro-
cessing steps (Eqs. 16–18).
In Simulation 1, we investigated the behavior of SOB-CS
by simulating a hypothetical experiment that combined the
three independent variables that have been manipulated in
separate behavioral experiments to establish the first set of
Table 2 Benchmark findings from complex span (regular font) and new predictions from SOB-CS (italics)
Finding Brief Description References
Cognitive-load effect Increasing pace of processing operations impairs memory.
Increasing operation duration while holding pace
constant impairs memory.
Barrouillet et al. (2004); Barrouillet et al. (2007) ;
Hudjetz & Oberauer (2007); Liefooghe,
Barrouillet, Vandierendonck, & Camos (2008)
Effects of operation
duration and free time
The effect of operation duration is smaller than that of
free time
Present experiments (Electronic Supplementary
Material)
Effect of number of
operations
At constant cognitive load, number of operations has no
effect on memory when distractors are identical, and it
impairs memory when distractors differ.
Barrouillet et al. (2004); Lewandowsky et al.
(2010); Oberauer & Lewandowsky (2008)
Serial-position curve Serial-position curves are characterized by extended
primacy and small recency.
Present reanalysis of Lewandowsky et al. (2010);
analyses of reading span and operation span in
Oberauer & Lewandowsky (2011)Serial-position curves of complex span are parallel to
those of simple span.
Error types The proportion of order errors follows an inverted U-shaped
function over serial position; the proportion of item errors
increases monotonically.
Present reanalysis of Lewandowsky et al. (2010);
analyses of reading span and operation span in
Oberauer & Lewandowsky (2011)
More order errors than item errors occur with simple span;
the reverse is true for complex span.
Transposition gradients Transpositions follow the “locality constraint”: They are
more likely to occur to close than to distant positions.
Present reanalysis of Lewandowsky et al. (2010);
analyses of reading span and operation span in
Oberauer & Lewandowsky (2011)Transposition gradients are equally steep for simple and
complex span.
Item–distractor similarity:
Proximity
Similar distractors interfere less with memory than do
dissimilar distractors if they immediately follow items
that they are similar to.
Oberauer et al. (2012)
Item–distractor similarity:
Categorical
Recall is worse when distractors come from the same category
as the items than when they come from different categories.
Conlin et al. (2005); Turner & Engle (1989)
Item–distractor similarity:
Feature-space overlap
Processing tasks in the same content domain interfere more
with memory than do processing tasks in a different domain.
Bayliss et al. (2003); Myerson et al. (1999)
Correlation of simple and
complex span
Simple- and complex-span measures load on separate but
correlated factors.
Gathercole et al. (2004); Kane et al. (2004)
Correlation across content
domains
Span tasks with verbal and visuospatial content load on
separate but correlated factors.
Alloway et al. (2006); Kane et al. (2004)
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benchmark findings. The simulated experiment was the
same as the one we used to demonstrate the feasibility of
TBRS* (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011, Simulation 1).
The independent variables were (1) number of distractor
operations per episode (zero, one, four, or eight), where zero
operations defines the simple-span baseline; (2) operation
duration (0.3, 0.5, or 0.7 s)—that is, the duration of atten-
tional capture for each operation; and (3) free time following
each operation (0, 0.1, 0.6, 1.2, or 2 s). Crossing of the latter
two variables generated 15 levels of cognitive load, com-
puted as operation duration divided by the sum of operation
duration and free time (for a summary of the cognitive-load
values, see Table 3). The simulated experiment used letters
as memory items and digits as distractors, as did most of the
experiments of Barrouillet et al. (2004). The simulated ex-
periment involved 500 virtual participants, each of whom
completed three trials for each list length (one to nine) in
each condition.
Cognitive load
Figure 5 shows memory performance as a function of cog-
nitive load for the four levels of number of operations (the
simple-span baseline was replicated 15 times, generating
one data point plotted at each level of load; the variability
between these 15 identical replications provides an estimate
of random noise in the simulated data). The top panel
presents performance expressed as span, computed as in
Barrouillet et al. (2004), and the bottom panel presents
results as the proportions of items recalled in correct order
for seven-item lists. Both figures show that memory accu-
racy declined in an approximately linear fashion with in-
creasing cognitive load, in accordance with the data.
The span-over-load function produced by SOB-CS is not
entirely linear; it contains small but systematic nonmonoto-
nicities. These deviations from linearity can be explained by
looking at the effects of the two variables that constitute
cognitive load, the duration of each operation and the free
time following it. Figure 6 plots span as a function of
operation duration and free time (averaging conditions with
one, four, and eight operations). Operation duration has only
a very small effect, and hardly any effect beyond 0.5 s,
Table 3 Levels of cognitive load for Simulations 1 and 5
Load Operation Duration Free Time
0.13 0.3 2.0
0.20 0.3 / 0.5 1.2 / 2.0
0.26 0.7 2.0
0.29 0.5 1.2
0.33 0.3 0.6
0.37 0.7 1.2
0.45 0.5 0.6
0.54 0.7 0.6
0.75 0.3 0.1
0.83 0.5 0.1
0.88 0.7 0.1
1.0 0.3 / 0.5 / 0.7 0
Combinations of operation duration and free time that result in the
same cognitive load are listed in a single row
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792 Psychon Bull Rev (2012) 19:779–819
because after 0.5 s the strength of distractor encoding has
nearly reached asymptote. Free time has a much larger
effect, albeit with diminishing returns. The comparatively
small effect of operation duration explains the nonmonoto-
nicity in the span-over-load function.5
The results of Simulation 1 clarify how SOB-CS accounts
for the first two of the three benchmark results cited in support
of the TBRS theory. First, increasing the pace of processing
for a fixed total processing duration decreases the free time
after each distractor operation, thereby leaving less time to
remove the preceding distractor. Second, increasing the dura-
tion of individual operations while holding their pace constant
has two effects in SOB-CS. One is that longer attention to
each distractor leads to stronger encoding, thereby creating
more interference. This effect is small and levels off after
500 ms. The other, more pronounced effect is that as more
of the fixed time between two operations is spent on process-
ing the distractor, less time is left for removing it.
Unpacking cognitive load: Operation duration and free time
Cognitive load is determined by two temporal variables, the
duration of distractor operations and the free time in between
them. These components play different roles in SOB-CS and
TBRS*. In SOB-CS, increasing the operation duration has
only a limited effect through increasing the strength of encod-
ing of interfering distractors (up to about 500 ms), whereas
increasing the free time has a more pronounced beneficial
effect because removal of the preceding distractor is a rela-
tively slow process. In TBRS*, extending the operation dura-
tion leads to more decay, which continues as long as attention
is captured by the operation, and extending the free time
enables more refreshing of memory items. The two models
differ in that SOB-CS predicts only a very small effect of
operation duration if free time is held constant, whereas
TBRS* predicts a much larger effect of operation duration
(Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011, Fig. 6).
To empirically dissociate operation time and free time,
we carried out three new experiments, using a method
introduced by Portrat, Barrouillet, and Camos (2008).
Participants remembered letters or words, and in between
each pair of memoranda they carried out a size judgment
task on words presented as distractors, deciding for each
distractor whether the object it represented was larger or
smaller than a soccer ball. Operation duration was varied
between trials by selecting objects close or distant in size to
a soccer ball. After each keypress indicating a decision, a
predetermined free-time interval was added before display
of the next distractor (i.e., the next word to be judged). The
amount of free time was varied orthogonally to operation
duration. These experiments are described in detail in
Electronic Supplementary Material. The top panel of
Fig. 7 shows correct-in-position recall accuracy. Whereas
free time had a consistent and sizeable effect across all three
experiments, the manipulation of operation duration had
only negligible (Exps. 1 and 2) or small (Exp. 3) effects.
In Simulation 2, we modeled these experiments with
SOB-CS and, for comparison, with TBRS*. We used the
response latencies for size judgments to estimate the opera-
tion duration (separate estimates were taken for the first
operation after each memory item and for successive oper-
ations because their latencies differed substantially; see
Electronic Supplementary Material). Overt response laten-
cies do not reflect the time for which a cognitive operation
captures central attention (Barrouillet et al., 2007; Pashler,
1994) because sensory and motor processing components
can be carried out independently of central attention.
Estimates of the duration of those noncentral processing
components are consistently between 350 and 550 ms
(S. D. Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff, Thapar, &
McKoon, 2004, 2010). We therefore subtracted a noncentral
component of 500 ms from the measured times to obtain an
estimate of central processing duration per size judgment.
The noncentral 500 ms were added to the nominal free time
because this time could be used to remove distractors (SOB-
CS) or to refresh memory items (TBRS*). In other words,
5 For instance, span at a cognitive-load level .33 is worse than expected
from a strictly linear function, and span at the following load level (.37)
is better than expected. Between the first and the second of these data
points, operation duration is more than doubled (from 0.3 to 0.7), and
free time is doubled (from 0.6 to 1.2). The increase of operation
duration, however, has only a negligible effect, whereas the increase
of free time has a more substantial effect. Therefore, span at the higher
load level exceeds that at the lower load level in this particular com-
parison, and in the others that generate nonmonotonicities in Fig. 5.
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we extended the nominal free time by 500 ms and reduced
the distractor-processing time by the same amount in order
to reflect the likelihood that some proportion of the distrac-
tor time did not involve the attentional bottleneck. Without
this assumption, both models would predict greatly exag-
gerated effects of free time, and TBRS* would underpredict
memory performance.
Figure 7 also shows the predictions of SOB-CS (middle
panel) and those of TBRS* (bottom panel). For SOB-CS,
we used the default parameter values, except for the dis-
crimination parameter c, which we raised to 2.0 to bring the
predictions into the overall accuracy range of the data. For
TBRS*, we also used the default parameter values
(Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011), except for the decay
rate, which we reduced from 0.5 to 0.4 to raise performance
to the empirical accuracy level. The simulation results of
SOB-CS confirm what we saw in Simulation 1: Free time
had a relatively large effect, whereas the effect of operation
duration was tiny. The simulation with TBRS* shows much
larger effects of operation duration than does SOB-CS. This
is because in TBRS*, longer operations lead to more decay,
which results in substantial forgetting.
For a quantitative comparison of the data with the pre-
dictions of the two models, we focused on the critical effect
of operation duration. Across the three experiments, the
mean effect of the manipulation of operation duration (i.e.,
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from three experiments varying
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size judgment difficulty) on memory was a 2.3-percentage-
point loss of performance, with a 95 % confidence interval
of [0.8, 3.8]. The predicted effect from SOB-CS was 1.0
percentage points, falling inside the confidence interval of
the data. The predicted effect of TBRS* was 8.6 percentage
points, clearly outside the confidence interval. Therefore,
the data support the unique prediction of SOB-CS that the
effect of cognitive load primarily reflects a beneficial effect
of free time following a distractor, whereas the duration
required to process the distractor plays only a minor role.
One potential objection to our model comparison in this
section is that our simulations were contingent on our esti-
mate of the time for sensory and motor processes (500 ms),
during which central attention was not occupied. With dif-
ferent estimates for the duration of noncentral processes,
TBRS* might give a better account of the data, and SOB-
CS might look worse. To investigate this issue, we ran the
simulations with different values for the assumed duration
of noncentral processes, ranging from an implausibly short
0.1 s to an implausibly long 0.8 s. The results of these
simulations are presented in Electronic Supplementary
Material; they show that, irrespective of the particular esti-
mate of the noncentral component in the size-judgment
latencies, SOB-CS gives a better account of the data than
does TBRS*.
The effect of the number of operations
The third benchmark finding cited in support of the TBRS is
that the number of operations in between memoranda has no
effect on memory. Barrouillet et al. (2004) predicted from their
model that as long as cognitive load was held constant, the
number of successive distractor operations in a complex-span
task should not affect memory performance. This prediction
plays an important role in the TBRS theory, because it protects
the theory against a challenge that other decay-based theories
face. Much evidence against decay has come from studies
showing that extending a distractor-filled retention interval
has no effect on memory (for a review, see Lewandowsky,
Oberauer, & Brown, 2009). The TBRS theory apparently
escapes this challenge by predicting that the retention interval
will have no effect as long as cognitive load is held constant.
Therefore, it is important to examine this prediction carefully.
Simulations with TBRS* have revealed a deviation from
the predictions derived by Barrouillet et al. (2004), for
reasons that are intuitively obvious upon closer inspection.
TBRS* predicts that memory will decline with an increasing
number of operations when cognitive load is at least mod-
erately high (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011). Brief re-
flection reveals this prediction to be inevitable within the
TBRS theory: The only circumstance under which perfor-
mance can be independent of the number of operations is
when the time for refreshing exactly balances the decay
experienced during processing. Whenever the effect of de-
cay is stronger than that of refreshing during an individual
processing operation (and the free time following it), the
TBRS theory must predict that increasing the number of
operations will lead to worse memory. We confirmed this
prediction by simulation with TBRS* (Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2011). We next consider the empirical pat-
tern involving the effects of the number of operations,
before we turn to simulations of SOB-CS to investigate
whether the model can reproduce that empirical pattern.
Empirically, the effect of increasing the number of oper-
ations is quite nuanced and is determined by the relationship
between the successive distractors in a processing episode
(Lewandowsky et al., 2010; Lewandowsky, Geiger, &
Oberauer, 2008). When the distractors are all identical
(e.g., “April, April, April”), saying them three or four times
does not lead to more forgetting than does saying them once.
In contrast, when three different distractors (e.g., “April,
May, June”) follow each memory item at encoding, recall
is substantially impaired relative to a single distractor. Thus,
any forgetting that could be attributed to decay is turned on
or off depending on properties of the stimuli that are not
considered relevant by the TBRS theory.
By contrast, these effects are predicted by a key principle of
the SOB model series—namely, novelty-gated encoding:
After processing and encoding the first distractor, each further
identical distractor has negligible novelty, and hence is
encoded with negligible strength. In contrast, when successive
distractors differ from one another, each of them is to some
degree novel, and therefore is encoded with substantial
strength, thus adding to interference. When a series of differ-
ent distractors follows each memory item, SOB predicts that
memory will suffer when more of them are added.
To illustrate this pattern, the top panel of Fig. 8 shows
representative data from an experiment with four conditions
(Lewandowsky et al., 2010, Exp. 3). The experiment involved
a simple-span condition (no distractors), a condition with a
single word to be read aloud after each memory item, a
condition with four identical words to be read after each item,
and a condition with three different words to be read after each
item (four identical and three different words took an approx-
imately equal amount of time to articulate). Participants were
asked to read the distractors as quickly as possible, and the
experimenter continued the sequence of events as soon as
participants had finished speaking. The data in Fig. 8 show
that performance dropped substantially from simple span to
the condition with a single distractor, an effect that was largely
additive with serial position. Reading the same word four
times produced little additional forgetting; the small additional
loss of memory was confined to the primacy part of the list.
Reading three different words, in contrast, incurred a substan-
tial further loss of memory. This effect was again largely
additive with serial position.
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The middle panel of Fig. 8 shows the results of Simulation
3, in which we applied SOB-CS to the same experimental
conditions. The simulation used letters as memoranda and
words as distractors to match the materials in the experiment.
Representations were generated such that different words had
an average similarity (i.e., vector cosine) of .5 with each other,
and words overall had an average similarity of approximately
.1 with the letters. Operation duration was set to 0.5 s, the
value that results in near-asymptotic encoding of each distrac-
tor, in accordance with the measured word-reading latencies
(>2 s for three words). Free time was set to 0.1 s to reflect the
fact that there was hardly any temporal gap between the
reading of successive words, as enforced by the experimenter,
who urged participants to speak continuously without pauses
and advanced the display sequence as soon as they had fin-
ished speaking.
With the exception of the recency effect for the single-
distractor condition (which was predicted but absent in the
data), the simulation closely matched the empirical data. In
particular, SOB-CS accurately reproduced the interaction
between number of distractor operations and distractor sim-
ilarity: Increasing the number of distractors had an adverse
effect on memory if and only if the distractors differed. This
interaction presents a challenge for TBRS, which has no
mechanisms sensitive to the similarity between distractors.
This raises the question: how well could TBRS* account for
the data of Experiment 3 in Lewandowsky et al. (2010) if
additional assumptions were made that were particularly
favorable to the model?
The bottom panel of Fig. 8 reproduces a simulation with
TBRS* for that experiment (Oberauer & Lewandowsky,
2011). For this simulation, we assumed that whereas reading
a new word occupies the attentional bottleneck for 0.3 s,
repeating the same word does not require any further atten-
tion after the first word. Thus, cognitive load is assumed to
be substantially lower in the condition with four identical
than with three different distractors. It is important to realize
that those assumptions are maximally favorable to TBRS*:
In actual fact, reading-aloud repetitions of a word off the
screen are unlikely to be completely attention-free. Only if
we make this favorable assumption can TBRS* account for
the relative accuracies of the four experimental conditions,
averaged across serial positions. However, even under these
favorable circumstances, TBRS* erroneously predicts that
the effects of distractors will be entirely absent at the first list
position and will increase strongly over serial positions,
particularly at the last position. We will explore the reason
for this erroneous prediction in the next section, when we
discuss serial-position effects.
To summarize, SOB-CS correctly predicts that the effect of
the number of distractor operations is modulated by the sim-
ilarity of successive distractors. TBRS* can provide a post-
hoc explanation for this modulation, but still it accounts for
the detailed pattern of data less well than does SOB-CS.
Discussion: Cognitive load and number of operations
The strong and approximately linear relationship between
memory performance and cognitive load (Barrouillet et al.,
2004; Barrouillet et al., 2011) has been one of the important
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Fig. 8 Top panel: Serial-position curves for simple span (“No Dis-
tractors”) and complex span with three conditions of word reading: a
single word (“1 Distractor”), the same word four times (“4 Identical”),
and three different words (“3 Different”). The data are from Experi-
ment 3 of “Turning Simple Span Into Complex Span: Time for Decay
or Interference From Distractors?” by S. Lewandowsky, S. M. Geiger,
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discoveries of the last decade in the field of working mem-
ory. There is little doubt that this function results from the
interplay of two opposing processes: one that is detrimental
to memory and occurs during distractor processing, and one
that is beneficial to memory and occurs during brief pauses
in between processing of the memoranda and distractors.
To date, the only available explanation for the cognitive-
load effect has identified time-based decay and refreshing of
memory traces, respectively, as those two opposing processes.
This explanation lies at the core of the TBRS model.
Independent evidence, however, strongly speaks against a
major role of time-based decay in short-term or working mem-
ory (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Brown, 2009). This raises the
question of whether the effect of cognitive load on immediate
memory can be explained without assuming decay. Our simu-
lations have established that SOB-CS reproduces the bench-
mark cognitive-load findings from complex-span tasks without
invoking decay, and without invoking rehearsal or refreshing.
These simulation results show that the crucial finding upon
which the TBRS was built—the cognitive-load function—
does not constitute unique evidence for that theory. On the
contrary, when cognitive load is broken down into its two
temporal components—operation duration and free time—
SOB-CS arguably provides a better quantitative account of
their individual effects than does TBRS*.
SOB-CS also accounts for the detailed pattern of results
concerning the third benchmark, the effect of the number of
operations. A previous version of C-SOB correctly pre-
dicted that under high cognitive loads, the number of oper-
ations would matter if and only if the distractors differed
from each other; SOB-CS reproduced that pattern here.
TBRS* can explain this finding only with the addition of
favorable assumptions about variations in operation dura-
tion, and even then it mispredicts the interaction of the
distractor effect with serial position.
The success of SOB-CS in modeling the first three bench-
mark findings lends support to the assumptions responsible
for this success: Forgetting in working memory is primarily
due to interference; concurrent processing adds to interference
because distractor information is encoded into working mem-
ory; and the strength of distractor encoding is modulated by
the distractor’s novelty, whereas free time following distractor
operations can be used to reduce interference by gradually
unbinding the preceding distractor from its context marker.
Inside complex span: Serial-position curves and error
patterns
Our second set of empirical benchmarks involves the serial-
position curve for the conventional method of scoring (i.e.,
recall of the correct item in the correct position), as well as for
item errors and order errors within the complex-span task.
SOB-CS makes two novel predictions for these benchmarks,
both of which pertain to a comparison of simple to complex
span. Our search of the literature revealed that the experiments
of Lewandowsky et al. (2010) are the only ones that afford a
controlled comparison of the serial-position curves for simple
and complex span. Simulation 3 above demonstrated that
SOB-CS accurately reproduces these serial-position curves.
For the present discussion, we will focus on the condition
without distractors (simple span) and on the condition with
three different distractors following each letter, because that
condition is most representative of complex-span tasks.
Serial-position curves
One prediction from SOB-CS is that the serial-position curves
of simple span and complex span are largely parallel, as is
shown in the middle panel of Fig. 8. This prediction is impor-
tant because it distinguishes SOB-CS from models assuming
decay together with rehearsal or refreshing to counteract it,
such as the TBRS* model. As noted above, TBRS* predicts a
strong interaction of the contrast between simple and complex
span with serial position, with hardly any effect of distractor
processing on recall of the first list item, and increasingly
adverse effects for later list items. The reason for this predic-
tion is that TBRS*must assume cumulative refreshing; that is,
in each free-time interval, refreshing starts with the first list
item. Decay models of complex span must assume cumulative
rehearsal or refreshing, because decay alone imposes a strong
recency gradient on memory strength (i.e., early list items
decay more than later items). Cumulative refreshing, which
prioritizes earlier list items, is needed to overcome this recen-
cy gradient and instead to produce a primacy effect on recall
(Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011).6
Cumulative refreshing largely protects the first item from
decay in complex span. As cognitive load in complex span
increases, refreshing progresses less far into the list (because
less free time is available), but as long as cognitive load is not
extremely high, the first item is always refreshed. In conse-
quence, TBRS* must predict that the first list item is largely
immune to manipulations of interference or cognitive load,
but that those effects will increase across serial positions. As
6 We investigated other refreshing schedules in the context of TBRS*
(Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011), such as selecting items for refresh-
ing at random or refreshing only the last-presented item. These resulted
in a serial-position curve with strong recency and little if any primacy,
because early list items have the longest retention intervals, and there-
fore suffer most from decay. We believe that we investigated all simple
and straightforward refreshing schedules, although other, more elabo-
rate schedules might be compatible with the largely additive effects of
serial positions and distractors, and at the same time still generate the
correct shape of the serial-position curve. As the space of possible
refreshing schedules is vast, it is impossible to explore them all. The
onus is now on decay theorists to propose a schedule that brings their
theory in line with the data.
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we noted in the introduction, any theory assuming decay
needs a mechanism of rehearsal or refreshing, and therefore
faces this problem.
SOB-CS does not predict this strong interaction, because it
does not require cumulative refreshing to maintain a list in
memory. Instead, distractor interference and distractor remov-
al apply in the same way to each list position. As is shown in
the top panel of Fig. 8, the prediction of largely parallel serial-
position curves for simple and complex span was borne out by
the data. This confirms the first new prediction of SOB-CS.
Item and order errors
The second new prediction concerns the relative frequencies of
item errors and order errors in simple and complex span. An
error is regarded as an order error if a list item is recalled in the
wrong position, whereas all other errors (recalling a nonlist
item or failing to recall anything and saying “pass,” if this is
allowed in the experiment) are counted as item errors. An
analysis of error types generated by SOB-CS in Simulation 3
showed that, whereas order errors predominate in simple span,
item errors are more frequent than order errors in complex
span. Figure 9 presents these predictions (top panel) and
corresponding data (bottom panel) from Experiment 3 of
Lewandowsky et al. (2010). As predicted, order errors were
more frequent than item errors for simple span (a common
finding; see Henson, Norris, Page, & Baddeley, 1996), but this
relation reversed for complex span, where item errors were
equally frequent at the early list positions, and were even more
frequent than order errors at the later list positions. For both
span tasks, order errors showed marked recency (i.e., a decline
of order errors in the last output position), whereas item errors
showed hardly any decline toward the end of the list. Again,
this is a known pattern for simple span (Henson, 1996), and
was also observed in a reanalysis of reading span and operation
span data (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011).7
Figure 10 breaks down the order errors further by plotting
the transposition gradient; that is, it shows order errors
(“transpositions”) broken down by direction and distance
of migration. For instance, if the item presented in List
Position 4 is recalled in List Position 3, that would be an
anticipation by one position (i.e., a migration of –1). Model
predictions, calculated from Simulation 3, are presented in
the top panel, and corresponding data from Lewandowsky et
al. (2010) in the bottom panel. In both the simulated and
observed data, the transposition gradients of simple and
complex span are remarkably parallel. They are character-
ized by two effects. First, they reflect the well-known “lo-
cality constraint” (Henson et al., 1996), such that migrations
become increasingly rare with larger migration distance.
Second, anticipations (i.e., negative migrations) are more
7 Unsworth and Engle (2006), reanalyzing data from Kane et al.
(2004), reported serial-position effects on correct recall, intrusions,
and omissions that differed in some regards from published data with
simple span tasks and from our data from complex-span tasks.
Unsworth and Engle (2006) found that the probability of omissions
was largest at the first and last output positions and that the probability
of intrusions was largest at the second output position, and from that
point decreased monotonically with output position. We believe that
this unusual pattern was a consequence of the lack of control over
output order: Participants were asked to write the memoranda into slots
on an answer sheet; they could fill the slots in any order. It is likely that
participants often began recall by putting the last list item in the last
slot (Lewandowsky, Brown, & Thomas, 2009), thereby avoiding in-
trusion errors at that position. Because of the apparently uncontrolled
output order in the study of Unsworth and Engle (2006), we do not
compare our simulations to their detailed analysis of errors. This
critique does not invalidate the analyses of Kane et al. (2004), which
relied on scores aggregated across serial positions.
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Fig. 9 Item errors (intrusions) and order errors (transpositions). Top:
Predictions generated by Simulation 3. Bottom: Data from Experiment
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Oberauer, 2010, pp. 958–978. Copyright 2010 by the American Psy-
chological Association
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frequent than postponements. This is an asymmetry that has
been reported before for simple span, although it is not
found as consistently as the locality effect (Haberlandt,
Thomas, Lawrence, & Krohn, 2005).
In the model, the locality constraint results from the
association of items to position markers, together with
the overlap of neighboring position markers, which
decreases over positional distance. Therefore, each posi-
tion marker cues not only the item associated with it,
but also items associated with neighboring positions to
the degree that the position markers overlap. As a
consequence, the retrieved vector is similar not only to
the correct item but also, to some degree, to the neigh-
boring items, such that close neighbors have a higher
chance of being confused with the correct item than do
more distant neighbors.
Discussion: Serial-position effects and error types
To conclude, SOB-CS accurately predicted detailed patterns
of behavior in simple and complex span: the serial-position
curve, the proportions of item and order errors as a function
of serial position, and the transposition gradients. The
results of these simulations confirm a number of assump-
tions in SOB-CS. Complex span and simple span use the
same basic mechanisms for remembering lists in serial or-
der: Items are associated with position markers that overlap
as a function of their ordinal distance. In complex span, as in
simple span, position markers are advanced with every new
list item, not with every event (i.e., not by distractors) or by
the passage of time alone. If position markers changed with
every distractor, or with the passage of time (as is assumed
in temporal-distinctiveness models; G. D. A. Brown, Neath,
& Chater, 2007), the position markers of neighboring items
would be much more dissimilar in complex span than in
simple span, and the transposition gradient of complex span
would be flatter.
The main difference between the two paradigms is the
added interference to item representations from the super-
position of distractor information in complex span.
Encoding of distractors distorts the associations of memory
items with their positions, thereby impairing the reconstruc-
tion of the original item from the retrieved approximation
vi'. Interference from distractors does not render the re-
trieved item representations more similar to each other, it
only makes them less similar to their original representa-
tions; this is why the distractors increase item errors more
than order errors. Because distractors are associated with the
preceding item’s position, each list item suffers about the
same degree of distractor interference in complex span.
Therefore, the effect of distractors is largely additive with
serial position. As we have seen in the simulations with
TBRS*, the additive effect of distractors is not easily
explained in the context of models that rely on decay and
cumulative rehearsal or refreshing.
Similarity between items and distractors
Interference is commonly assumed to depend on similarity
between the interfering materials. Therefore, every interfer-
ence model should predict similarity effects in working
memory correctly. Similarity between list items is known
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Fig. 10 Transposition gradients, showing transpositions by direction
and distance of migration. Top: Data generated by Simulation 3.
Bottom: Data from Experiment 3 of “Turning Simple Span Into Com-
plex Span: Time for Decay or Interference From Distractors?” by S.
Lewandowsky, S. M. Geiger, D. B. Morrell, and K. Oberauer, 2010,
pp. 958–978. Copyright 2010 by the American Psychological Associ-
ation. Negative migrations are anticipations, and positive migrations
are postponements. The values plotted are proportions of responses in
each migration category, averaged across those output positions for
which a given migration category is logically possible. For instance,
anticipations by one position (migration 0 –1) are possible for Output
Positions 1–4 but not for 5, because there is no item in Input Position 6.
For analogous reasons, anticipations by three positions are possible
only for Output Positions 1 and 2, so we averaged only across these
two output positions for calculating the proportion of migrations by –3.
This procedure corrects the transposition gradients for chance
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to have a detrimental effect on serial recall, and previous
versions of SOB have accounted for these similarity effects
in great detail (Farrell, 2006; Farrell & Lewandowsky,
2003). We therefore do not address interitem similarity
within memory lists again, but instead focus on a similarity
relation that is pertinent particularly to complex span—
namely, the similarity between memory items and distrac-
tors—as our third set of benchmark results.
The investigation of item–distractor similarity has a long
history in memory research (e.g., Corman &Wickens, 1968;
Dale & Gregory, 1966; Murray, 1967; Posner & Konick,
1966), with results that have been mixed and difficult to
interpret because of the large variety of ways in which
similarity has been manipulated. For our discussion, we
distinguish three kinds of similarity between items and dis-
tractors. They can be explained by thinking of each item or
distractor as a point in a multidimensional feature space (see
Fig. 11). In distributed representations, as used by SOB-CS,
each feature dimension could be represented by one unit,
with different feature values coded by different activation
values on that unit.
The first kind of similarity is proximity in feature space.
When an item and a distractor come from the same broad
category (e.g., both are words), they share the same feature
space, which means that they can be meaningfully compared
on the same feature dimensions. Their similarity can be
evaluated as the proportions of features that they share
(e.g., shared semantic features or shared rhyme), which is
reflected in their proximity in feature space (see objects A
and B in Fig. 11). This is the kind of similarity relation
usually manipulated between memory items in simple-span
paradigms.
The second kind is categorical similarity: Research on
the relation between memory and distractor materials often
manipulates whether they come from the same broad cate-
gory. For instance, when words are used as the memory
items, the distractors in the similar conditions would also be
words (or sentences), and the distractors in the dissimilar
condition could be digits (or equations). In this case, the
items and distractors might still have a large degree of
feature overlap (e.g., words and digits share many pho-
nemes), but they would nevertheless be clearly distinct by
their category membership (e.g., objects B and C in Fig. 11).
This can be expressed by a category boundary in feature
space.
A third kind of relation, which can also be thought of as
similarity in a broad sense, is the degree of feature-space
overlap. When items and distractors are from different rep-
resentational domains (e.g., verbal vs. visuospatial), they
cannot be meaningfully compared within the same feature
space, because their features are values on different dimen-
sions (e.g., objects A and D in Fig. 11). For instance, the
question of how many features a phonological and a spatial
representation share does not even arise, because spatial
Feature  
Dimension Y 
Feature  
Dimension 2 
Feature Dimension 1 
Feature  
Dimension X 
Verbal Domain 
Visual Domain 
A
B 
C
D
Fig. 11 Illustration of three kinds of similarity. Each box represents
the feature space (showing only two dimensions) for one representa-
tional domain. The curved line in the “verbal” feature space is a
category boundary (e.g., the difference between digits and nondigit
words). Items A, B, C, and D are represented as points in their feature
space. The proximity in feature space between A, B, and C is about the
same, but C differs categorically from A and B. Item D is a visual
object that is placed in the “visual” feature space, which has different
feature dimensions than the “verbal” space. Proximity between D and
the verbal items is not defined, because they cannot be compared on
the same feature dimensions. If D can be compared to A, B, or C on
some but not all of its feature dimensions, then their feature spaces
partially overlap (not shown in this figure, but see Fig. 14)
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representations do not include phonemes, and phonological
representations do not include spatial features. In what fol-
lows, we will investigate all three kinds of similarity
through simulations in SOB-CS.
Proximity in feature space between items and distractors
When items and distractors come from the same stimulus
category (e.g., words), similarity between items and distrac-
tors can be manipulated in the same way as similarity within
lists.We recently explored this kind of similarity manipulation
through simulations with SOB-CS and in a series of experi-
ments (Oberauer, Farrell, Jarrold, Pasiecznik, & Greaves,
2012). We discovered that, under certain conditions, SOB-
CS predicts better memory with higher item–distractor simi-
larity. This similarity benefit arises if and only if the distractors
immediately follow the items that they are similar to.
The item–distractor similarity benefit is a counterintuitive
prediction that arises from the conjunction of two assumptions
that are unique to SOB-CS: First, representations of items,
distractors, and their positions are distributed, and second,
each distractor is encoded by associating it with the position
of the preceding item. The distributed nature of representa-
tions in SOB-CS implies interference by superposition. Each
item–position association, and likewise, each distractor–posi-
tion association, creates a distributed pattern of changes to the
same weight matrix. Thus, all associations are superimposed,
and each individual association is distorted by all others
present in the weight matrix. This interference by superposi-
tion is the main cause of forgetting in SOB-CS.
An item–position association is distorted by the subse-
quent association of a distractor with the same position. The
degree of distortion—and, hence, of interference—is larger
if the pattern of weight changes induced by encoding the
distractor differs substantially from the pattern of weight
changes induced by encoding the preceding item. If a dis-
tractor following an item is similar to that item, it induces a
pattern of weight changes that is largely congruent with the
item–position association, distorting it less than does a dis-
tractor that is dissimilar to the item. This is illustrated in
Fig. 12. For this reason, SOB-CS predicts that interference
from distractors in complex span is less severe if the
item layer 
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Fig. 12 Illustration of the
beneficial effect of item–
distractor similarity through
superposition in the weight
matrix. The state after encoding
the item vi is shown at the top.
To the left is the situation in
which a similar distractor
following that item is associated
with the same position pi. The
weight matrix is changed
(strengthened connections
become bolder, weakened ones
thinner) by superimposing the
distractor–position association
upon the item–position
association (and all previously
encoded associations). This
change does not seriously
distort the pattern of connection
weights. On the right, a
dissimilar distractor is instead
associated with the same
position, distorting the weight
matrix toward a diffuse pattern.
At retrieval (bottom row), a
vector similar to the original
item vi is retrieved on the left,
but a more blurred vector that is
less similar to the original is
retrieved on the right
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distractors are similar to the immediately preceding items.
No such similarity benefit is predicted in case distractors are
similar to the items following them. The reason for this
asymmetry is that in SOB-CS, distractors are associated
but this relation reversed for complex span, where with the
position of the preceding item, so it is their similarity to the
preceding item that matters, and they have a diminished
effect on the subsequent encoding of items that are associ-
ated with a different context marker.
We tested these predictions with four experiments manip-
ulating the phonological similarity between nonword items
and nonword distractors (Oberauer et al., 2012). Each mem-
orandum was followed by two distractors to be read aloud. In
the similar-following condition, each item was followed by
two distractors similar to it. Using capital letters for memo-
randa and lowercase letters for distractors, such a sequence
would be AaaBbbCccDdd, with each letter denoting a set of
similar nonwords. In the similar-preceding condition, the
items and distractors were still similar to each other, but
the distractors were followed by the items similar to them:
AbbBccCddDaa. In the control condition, the items and
distractors were dissimilar throughout: AeeBffCggDhh.
Figure 13 shows the predictions from SOB-CS (left pan-
els) and the data (right panels) from the similar-following
condition (top) and the similar-preceding condition (bot-
tom), each paired with a control condition. The experiments
confirmed the model’s prediction that similarity enhances
recall in the similarity-following condition but not in the
similarity-preceding condition (Oberauer et al., 2012). In
addition, a detailed analysis of distractor intrusions (not
reproduced here) showed that distractors tended to intrude
in the list position of the immediately preceding item, as
predicted from the assumption that distractors are associated
with the position of the preceding item. In addition, recall of
a distractor in place of an item was more likely if that
distractor was similar to the item. Thus, high item–distractor
similarity increases the chance of one particular kind of
error, even when it leads to better recall overall. This pattern
is precisely as predicted by SOB-CS (Oberauer et al., 2012).
It reflects two kinds of interference occurring in SOB-CS,
which are affected in opposite ways by similarity: High
similarity (i.e., proximity in feature space) increases the
chance of confusion between representations, if they are
both recall candidates. At the same time, high similarity
also reduces interference by superposition if both represen-
tations are associated with the same positional context.
Categorical similarity between items and distractors
Categorical similarity of items and distractors is varied when
items and distractors are drawn from the same versus from two
different categories. For instance, Turner and Engle (1989)
created four versions of complex span by combining memory
lists of words or of digits with distractor tasks involving words
(reading sentences) or involving digits (verifying equations).
Memory was worse for the combinations in which the items
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Fig. 13 Serial-position curves
for reconstruction of lists of
nonwords combined with
similar or dissimilar nonword
distractors. Top: Distractors
follow the items that they are
similar to. Bottom: Distractors
precede the items that they are
similar to. Predictions from
Simulation 8 are on the left;
experimental data are on the
right (with error bars reflecting
95 % confidence intervals for
within-subjects comparisons).
They are from Oberauer et al.
(2012), p. 9 (our top row of
figures) and p. 13 (bottom row)
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and distractors came from the same category. Conlin,
Gathercole, and Adams (2005) replicated this pattern. These
data show that whereas high feature-space proximity of items
and distractors within a category is neutral or even helpful for
memory, as discussed in the immediately preceding section
(Oberauer et al., 2012), high categorical similarity between
them is detrimental.
SOB-CS treats these two forms of item–distractor simi-
larity differently. When distractors come from a different
category than the items and people represent them as such
(such that they are separated by a represented category
boundary), we assume that people exclude the distractors
from the set of recall candidates. Even if the representation
retrieved at a given position were very blurry, people would
not report a digit if they knew that all of the memoranda
were words; the category boundary prevents interference by
confusion. Therefore, in our simulations we included the
distractors in the candidate set if and only if they came from
the same stimulus category as the items (with digits, letters,
and words constituting the three available categories for
verbal materials). These categories are so clearly distinct
that people arguably represent them as such, and this ena-
bles them to exclude distractors from the candidate set if
they come from a different category than the memoranda.
As a consequence, item–distractor combinations from the
same stimulus category are disadvantaged because of an
increased chance of intrusion errors from the distractor set.
Simulation 4 involved the four combinations of Turner and
Engle (1989). We simulated recall of six-item lists with four
operations after each item at an intermediate level of cogni-
tive load (0.5 s of operation duration, followed by 0.5 s of
free time). The mean accuracy for recalling digits was .75
when digits were used as the distractors, but it increased to
.80 when the distractors were words. In contrast, the mean
accuracy for recalling words was .52 with digit distractors,
which fell to .46 when words were used as the distractors.
Thus, SOB-CS reproduces the finding that memory is worse
when the distractors come from the same broad category as
the items.
Feature-space overlap between items and distractors
One longstanding question in working memory research has
been whether working memory is a unitary system or should
be conceived of as fractionated into separate, domain-
specific subsystems. Much research along these lines has
been guided by Baddeley’s (1986) tripartite model of work-
ing memory that proposes different subsystems for verbal
(in particular, phonological) and visuospatial maintenance.
Numerous studies have been conducted in search of double
dissociations between verbal (including numerical) and
visuospatial working memory with dual-task combinations
that cross the content domain of the primary task (verbal vs.
visuospatial) with that of the secondary task (see Jarrold,
Tam, Baddeley, & Harvey, 2011).
We focus here only on those studies that have investigat-
ed complex-span performance with verbal and with visuo-
spatial memory items, combining each with either verbal or
visuospatial distractor tasks. The results have been mixed.
Some experiments have found that distractor processing in
the same domain impaired memory, whereas distractor pro-
cessing in the other domain had no effect on memory at all
(Hale, Myerson, Rhee, Weiss, & Abrams, 1996; Myerson,
Hale, Rhee, & Jenkins, 1999), or had a substantially reduced
effect (Chein, Moore, & Conway, 2011; Shah & Miyake,
1996). Other researchers have found only partial dissocia-
tions, such that verbal memory was impaired more by verbal
than by visuospatial processing, but visuospatial memory
was impaired approximately equally by processing in both
domains (Bayliss et al., 2003; Vergauwe et al., 2010).
Different representational domains can be characterized
as separate feature spaces (illustrated by the rectangular and
diamond-shaped spaces in Fig. 11), which are implemented
in distributed neural networks such as SOB-CS as nonover-
lapping sets of units in the item layer. When items and
distractors have no shared feature dimensions (i.e., are rep-
resented by nonoverlapping feature spaces), they differ in
similarity in a different way than when they have no shared
features (i.e., they have low proximity within a feature
space). Two phonologically very dissimilar words might
share no features but still be located in the same feature
space. They are represented as different patterns across the
same set of units in the item layer, such that they distort each
other when superimposed. In contrast, a phonological rep-
resentation of a word and a visuospatial representation of
orientation cannot even be compared on any shared feature
dimension. Instead they are represented as patterns across
nonoverlapping sets of units, and therefore don’t interfere
with each other.
Thus, if the representations involved in the processing
activity of a complex-span task are from a domain entirely
different from that of the memory items, SOB-CS predicts
no interference between them. The problem with evaluating
this strong prediction against the existing data is that we
cannot be confident that a nominally visuospatial processing
task involves only visual or spatial representations, and that
a nominally verbal task involves only verbal representa-
tions, for at least four reasons.
First, some of the distractor tasks used in complex span
require processing of both verbal and visuospatial informa-
tion. For instance, the verbal processing task of Bayliss et al.
(2003) involved searching a visual display for an object
whose color matched that of an object named verbally.
Even an easy search task such as theirs involves moving
attention in space and processing the objects’ colors, thus
generating spatial and visual representations. Second, the
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presentation and response modalities of nominally verbal
processing tasks often involve visual and spatial features.
For instance, word reading involves processing of the visual
word form; sentence reading in addition involves eye move-
ments. Distractor tasks often require manual responses to
keys distinguished by their spatial locations (e.g., Vergauwe
et al., 2010). Both eye movements and limb movements to
spatial targets are known to disrupt spatial working memory
(Lawrence, Myerson, Oonk, & Abrams, 2001). Third, it is
usually not known to what degree people maintain in working
memory a verbal representation of the task instruction for a
nominally visuospatial processing task. For instance, the pro-
cessing component of complex-span tasks sometimes
involves choice tasks with arbitrary stimulus–response map-
pings (e.g., Vergauwe et al., 2010), and participants might use
verbal self-instruction to remind themselves of which re-
sponse key belongs to which stimulus category. Verbal self-
instruction has also been shown to assist in task switching
(Emerson & Miyake, 2003; Kray, Eber, & Karbach, 2008),
and the complex-span paradigm requires frequent switches
between encoding of memory items and working on the
processing component. Finally, representations of memory
items are often not domain-pure. Visual and spatial stimuli
are often encoded in verbal format (e.g., by describing the
position of a dot in a matrix as “middle-left”). Verbal items (in
particular, words) are often represented semantically, and the
meanings of many words are suffused with spatial aspects,
both literally and metaphorically (Bar-Anan, Liberman,
Trope, & Algom, 2007; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). This im-
purity of stimulus representations can also apply to the stimuli
involved in the processing task.
Accordingly, there are numerous reasons to believe that a
nominally verbal processing task does not involve purely
verbal representations, and that a nominally visuospatial
task does not involve purely visual or spatial representa-
tions. Therefore, the strong prediction of SOB-CS that pro-
cessing tasks from a different representational domain
should not interfere at all with memory is very difficult to
test in practice. Realistically, for most experiments we can
only make the weaker prediction that processing tasks
should interfere more with memory items in the same do-
main than with memory items in a different domain. On
balance, the extant evidence summarized above is consistent
with that prediction: There is some cross-domain interfer-
ence, but it is weaker than within-domain interference
(Jarrold et al., 2011).
In SOB-CS, we model tasks involving stimuli from both
verbal and nonverbal (e.g., visuospatial) domains by extend-
ing the item layer, as illustrated in Fig. 14. Assuming that
the original 150 units of the item layer serve to hold verbal
representations, a second set of 150 units is added to the
item layer to hold visuospatial representations. Purely verbal
……
150 verbal 150 visuo-spatial 
Weight matrix: 
16 x 300 
connections 
0   0  0   0  0   0  0   0    …         0   0   -1  1  -1 -1   1   1  1  -1  -1  1  -1   …      -1   1   0   0  0   0 
„visuo-
spatial“ 
distractor 
16 
position 
units 
Fig. 14 Extended architecture of SOB-CS, with an item layer covering
both verbal (first 150 units) and visuospatial (second 150 units) repre-
sentations. The whole item layer is connected by a weight matrix to the
position layer, so that verbal and visuospatial contents are associated
with the same position representations by different subsets of the
weight matrix (marked by horizontal–vertical shading for the verbal
subset and diagonal shading for the visuospatial subset). Representa-
tions involved in nominally “visuospatial” tasks are assumed to contain
variable amounts of verbal contents, thus recruiting a variable propor-
tion of verbal units, and vice versa. The figure illustrates the represen-
tation of a nominally visuospatial distractor by a vector of 150 nonzero
values, projected primarily over the visuospatial units but shifted
slightly into the verbal domain of the item layer. As a consequence,
weight changes imposed by encoding the distractor affect part of the
verbal section of the weight matrix (dark shading), thus creating
interference with verbal memory items
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representations would be vectors with nonzero values in the
first 150 units and zeros in the remaining units; purely
visuospatial representations would have nonzero values on-
ly in the second set of 150 units. In our simulations, we
allowed for a variable degree of domain impurity in the
representations of memory items and distractors. This im-
purity was implemented by shifting the representations to-
ward the middle of the item layer, so that a visuospatial
representation would invade the verbal section to some
degree, and vice versa (see Fig. 14).
Simulation 5 served to investigate the interference be-
tween memory items and distractors from different domains
under the assumption of different proportions of shared
feature dimensions. The simulation used a design similar
to that of Simulation 1, testing memory span for the same 15
levels of cognitive load but holding the number of opera-
tions constant at four. The memory items were letters; for
simplicity and consistency with the preceding simulations,
we assumed purely verbal representations for the letters. The
distractors were modeled as primarily visuospatial represen-
tations, with their degree of impurity (i.e., overlap with the
verbal section of the item layer) varied over six levels: 0, 5,
10, 20, 30, and 50 percent of the 150 units of the verbal
section were recruited for the distractor representations.
The resulting span-over-load functions for different pro-
portions of overlap are displayed in Fig. 15. They show that,
with no or very low overlap, distractors from a different
domain do not interfere with memory—as reflected in the
flat cognitive load function when the overlap is 0 %—
whereas with increasing overlap, the span-over-load func-
tions become steeper, approaching the degree of interference
obtained with distractors from the same domain (see the
predictions for four operations in the upper panel of Fig. 5).
We conclude that SOB-CS can explain the occasional
finding of cross-domain interference between memory and
processing by assuming some degree of task impurity.
Specifically, SOB-CS can explain the results of Vergauwe
et al. (2010), who demonstrated cross-domain interference
that increases linearly with cognitive load; this is shown in
the declining span-over-load curves in Fig. 15. At the same
time, the model can also reproduce the double dissociation
of verbal and visuospatial working memory: With less-than-
perfect overlap of feature dimensions, cross-domain inter-
ference is smaller than within-domain interference, as can be
seen by comparing Fig. 15 to Fig. 5. With no overlap, there
is no cross-domain interference at all. Thus, SOB-CS can
explain the main experimental evidence for the distinction
of domain-specific subsystems in working memory. SOB-
CS does not require such domain-specific subsystems, it
only requires the straightforward assumption that entities
in different domains are represented in different feature
spaces, such that their representations use different sets of
units.
Discussion: Variety of item–distractor similarity
To summarize, SOB-CS accounts for the effects of three
kinds of similarity (or dissimilarity) between items and
distractors (see Fig. 11). The most radical form of dissimi-
larity is a change of content domain. When distractors come
from a different content domain from that of the items, their
representations use only partially overlapping sets of units,
and therefore interference between them will be reduced
and, in extreme cases of no overlap, eliminated. In this
way, SOB-CS explains the frequently observed double dis-
sociation between verbal and visuospatial working memory
tests without assuming separate subsystems.
A second form of dissimilarity, combining items and
distractors from different categories within a content do-
main, also reduces the amount of interference, because it
facilitates exclusion of distractors from the set of recall
candidates.
Whereas the first two kinds of similarity increase interfer-
ence, SOB-CS predicts that the third kind, proximity between
items and distractors within the same feature space, reduces
interference under some conditions. Our experiments
(Oberauer et al., 2012) have confirmed this counterintuitive
prediction, lending strong support to the assumptions about
item–distractor interference in SOB-CS.
To understand the effects of the three kinds of similarity
on memory, it is important to consider how they modulate
the two kinds of interference in SOB-CS: interference from
superposition and interference by confusion. Interference
from superposition determines how much the retrieved
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Fig. 15 Simulation 4: Span-over-load functions for letters as memory
items and nonverbal distractors, varying the hypothesized degree of
overlap of feature dimensions (i.e., units of the item layer) between the
item and distractor representations
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vector vi' is distorted relative to the vector vi representing
the originally encoded stimulus. The extent of mutual dis-
tortion of two representations is larger, the more that their
feature spaces overlap. Within the feature space they have in
common, however, higher similarity (i.e., higher proximity)
implies less distortion.
The second form of interference occurs through confu-
sion of the correct item with another recall candidate. This
occurs when the retrieved vector vi' is compared to all recall
candidates. The chance of interference by confusion
depends on which elements are included in the candidate
set; this is why excluding distractors from a different cate-
gory than the memoranda improves complex-span perfor-
mance. The probability of confusion also increases with the
proximity among the candidates in feature space. Thus,
proximity in feature space has two opposing effects: It
reduces the degree of interference from superposition, and
it increases the chance of interference by confusion. Both
effects were shown in experiments in which we varied the
phonological similarity of items and distractors (Oberauer et
al., 2012): Higher similarity improved memory overall, but
also led to a specific increase of intrusions from distractors
replacing the items that they were similar to.
Individual differences
Much of the appeal of the complex-span paradigm comes
from its impressive success as a tool for assessing working
memory capacity as an individual-differences variable, both
within an age group (Conway et al., 2005; Engle, Tuholski,
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, &
Engle, 2001) and across age groups at both ends of the life
span (Bayliss, Jarrold, Baddeley, Gunn, & Leigh, 2005;
Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004; J.
McCabe & Hartman, 2003). Our final simulation thus
addressed individual differences in simple- and complex-
span performance.
Findings from correlational studies with span tasks can
be grouped into two sets: those concerning correlations
between different kinds of simple and complex span, and
those concerning correlations of span tasks to external cri-
teria, such as measures of intelligence or academic achieve-
ment, or to experimental tasks measuring various cognitive
constructs. The latter set, though undoubtedly theoretically
highly relevant, are currently outside the scope of our mod-
eling, because modeling these relationships would require
modeling not only the span task but also the external criteria
(e.g., performance on intelligence tests). Therefore, we will
focus here on the first group of findings.
Within our chosen set, two phenomena are well estab-
lished: First, complex-span tasks and simple-span tasks load
on separate but correlated factors (Bayliss et al., 2003;
Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002;
Gathercole et al., 2004; Kane et al., 2004). Second, when
span tasks with contents from different domains (i.e., ver-
bal–numerical vs. visuospatial) are used, they load on sep-
arate but highly correlated factors. Both of these benchmark
findings are reflected in the largest existing data set on the
factor structure of span tasks, the study by Kane et al.
(2004). We therefore used the factor structure in their study,
reproduced in the top panel of Fig. 16, as the target for
Simulation 6.
One noteworthy feature of the four-factor structure of
Kane et al. is that the two complex-span factors are more
closely correlated (.83) than are the two simple-span factors
(.63). This pattern has also been observed in a large corre-
lational study of working memory in children (Alloway,
Gathercole, & Pickering, 2006). This finding can be inter-
preted as reflecting a domain-general source of variance that
affects complex span more strongly than simple span.
In computational models such as SOB-CS, individual dif-
ferences in task performance arise naturally from individual
differences in parameter values. In Simulation 6, we intro-
duced variance across the simulated subjects in the c param-
eter (which determines the discriminability between retrieval
candidates) and the r parameter (removal rate). We chose
differences in c as a source of variance shared between simple
and complex span but specific to each content domain, be-
cause it is plausible that the discriminability of representations
in the set of recall candidates is domain specific: Individuals
might have highly distinct verbal representations but less
distinct visuospatial representations, or the other way around.
Therefore, we assumed two uncorrelated c parameters, one for
verbal and one for spatial span tasks.
We chose differences in the removal rate r as a source of
variance that plays a larger role in complex than in simple
span, and thereby accounts for the distinction between
complex-span and simple-span measures. Recall that in
complex span, removal affects all distractors as well as list
items after their recall, whereas in simple span, removal is
limited to postrecall response suppression.
Simulation 6 reproduced the design of Kane et al. (2004),
crossing content domain (verbal–numerical vs. visuospatial)
with span type (simple vs. complex), representing each
design cell with three independent tasks. We created a
normal distribution of parameter values across subjects
(N 0 2,000), adding Gaussian noise with a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of 0.15 to the c parameter, and
adding Gaussian noise with a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of 0.5 to the r parameter. Two uncorrelated dis-
tributions of c were created in that way, one for the six
verbal span tasks and one for the six visuospatial span tasks.
A single distribution of r applied to all tasks. The means of c
and r, as well as the values of all other parameters, were the
same as in Simulation 1.
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The complex-span tasks of Kane et al. (2004) differed in the
processing tasks that they involved, and little information is
available about the operation durations and free time in these
tasks. For simplicity, we used the same time values for all six
complex-span tasks, assuming intermediate values (i.e., 0.5 s
operation duration followed by 0.5 s free time). Each complex-
span task involved four operations following each item.
The three span tasks in each design cell (e.g., the three
verbal complex spans) were simulated as three independent
replications with the same parameter values for each subject;
they differed only in the stimulus sets, which were generated
anew for each task, and the random noise introduced by output
interference. The tasks from different content domains in
addition differed by the individual parameter values of the
distinctiveness parameter c. As in Kane et al. (2004), each
subject completed three trials of each memory-set size for
each task; whereas in the original study the range of set sizes
was calibrated to each task’s difficulty, in the simulation we
ran all set sizes from one to nine for all tasks. Performance was
scored, as in Kane et al. (2004), by calculating the proportions
of items recalled in correct position, averaged across all trials
of each task.
The bottom panel of Fig. 16 shows the results of fitting a
four-factor structural-equation model to the simulated data.
The model gave an excellent fit for the data, χ2(48) 0 62.1,
CFI 0 .998, RMSEA 0 .012, SRMR 0 .014. Simulation 6
reproduced the key results of Kane et al. (2004): Spans from
different content domains loaded on separate but substan-
tially correlated factors. Within each domain, complex-span
factors were separate from, but highly correlated with, those
for simple span. This correlation was driven by the shared
variance of c. The cross-domain correlation was larger for
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Fig. 16 Factor structure of simple and complex span. The top figure is
reproduced with permission from the original article of Kane et al.
(2004) Top: Measurement model of Kane et al. (2004). Bottom: Mea-
surement model applied to the data of Simulation 5 [fit of the mea-
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complex than for simple span. Because the c parameters for
the verbal and spatial tasks were uncorrelated, the positive
correlation across domains could only come from variations
in r. The removal parameter r had a larger effect on cross-
domain correlations in complex span than on those in simple
span, because in simple span it only governed the effective-
ness of response suppression, whereas in complex span it
also governed the effectiveness of distractor removal.
Simulation 6 demonstrated that SOB-CS can reproduce
benchmark findings from individual-differences studies
concerning the factorial structure of span tasks. The simu-
lation showed that variation in two model parameters—the
discriminability of representations in the recall candidate
set, c, and the rate of removal, r—was sufficient to generate
the benchmark pattern of correlations. We do not claim that
variations in this particular pair of the parameters are
uniquely necessary to explain the data.
Evidence for a role of the distractor removal parameter r
in explaining individual differences in complex span comes
from a study by Carretti, Cornoldi, De Beni, and Palladino
(2004). They used a version of complex span in which, on
each trial, participants listened to several short word lists,
remembering the last word of each list. Whenever partici-
pants heard an animal word, they had to tap on the table. At
recall of the list-final words, people made more intrusions of
animal than of nonanimal distractors (replicating a previous
finding by De Beni, Palladino, Pazzaglia, & Cornoldi,
1998). Animal-distractor intrusions were specifically in-
creased in people with low working memory capacity.
Low-capacity participants also showed a larger priming
effect for the complex-span distractors in a subsequent lex-
ical decision task, and a larger latency advantage for accept-
ing animal distractors in a recognition test, when these tests
were carried out right after a complex-span trial. These
findings show that individual differences in how strongly
distractors remain in working memory at the end of a trial
are related to individual differences in capacity, as would be
expected if individual differences in the efficiency of re-
moving distractors (parameter r) were in part responsible for
variation in measures of working memory capacity.
General discussion
Working memory is one of the core constructs of cognitive
psychology. So far, theorizing in the field has primarily
involved the verbal description of components and mecha-
nisms. Our goal for this article was to apply the conceptual
rigor of computational modeling of serial-recall tasks to
complex span, one of the major paradigms for studying
working memory. This computational approach is embodied
in our interference model of working memory, SOB-CS. We
now discuss the key assumptions of the new model, its
limitations, its relations to other theories, and the most
important theoretical conclusions from our work.
New assumptions in SOB-CS: Distractor encoding
and removal
Our newmodel, SOB-CS, introduces two assumptions that go
beyond existing theories and models of working memory.
The first new assumption is that distractors create inter-
ference by being encoded into working memory. In partic-
ular, distractors are associated with the position of the
immediately preceding item, using the same mechanisms
as item encoding. This assumption is motivated by a host
of findings showing that memory encoding is an obligatory
byproduct of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Hyde &
Jenkins, 1969; Logan, 1988). In the field of immediate
recall, Phaf and Wolters (1993) provided direct evidence
that distractor words spoken aloud are incidentally encoded
into memory to the degree that they attract attention (see
also Aldridge, Garcia, & Mena, 1987). Therefore, we as-
sumed that the strength of distractor encoding is a function
of how long attention is devoted to processing them, as well
as of the novelty of the distractor. Evidence for the fact that
distractors are associated with the immediately preceding
item’s position marker comes from our finding that, when
distractors intrude into recall, they are more likely to replace
the immediately preceding item than another list item
(Oberauer et al., 2012).
The second new assumption in SOB-CS is particularly
novel and unique. During the free-time interval following
encoding of a distractor, that distractor’s association with the
currently focused position is gradually removed from memo-
ry. This assumption is supported by three lines of reasoning.
First, distractor removal is a natural extension of the mecha-
nism of response suppression in SOB, a process for which
there is strong evidence. For example, people are very unlike-
ly to commit repetition errors, even if lists contain repeated
items (Duncan & Lewandowsky, 2005; Henson, 1998a;
Jahnke, 1969). Our assumption in SOB-CS simply generalizes
the rationale and the already-existing mechanism of response
suppression: Representations that are no longer relevant are
removed by Hebbian antilearning. Thus, similar to the way in
which a just-recalled item is suppressed because it has become
irrelevant, the just-processed distractor is removed by an
identical process because it, too, has become irrelevant.
Second, removal of no-longer-relevant contents is a nec-
essary mechanism for a functioning working memory sys-
tem that does not rely on decay. Hasher, Zacks, and their
colleagues have argued that removal (in their terms, “dele-
tion”) of irrelevant working memory contents is one of the
inhibitory functions that becomes deficient as we reach old
age, and as a consequence, working memory becomes clut-
tered and is rendered inefficient (Hasher & Zacks, 1988;
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Hasher et al., 1999). Direct evidence for the removal of
irrelevant subsets of memory items comes from experiments
in which people encoded two sets of digits or words and
were then informed which of them was (temporarily or
permanently) irrelevant for the upcoming task. The effect
of the number of items in the irrelevant set on latencies for
accessing elements from the remaining set diminished grad-
ually over the time, disappearing 1–2 s after the cue
(Oberauer, 2001, 2002, 2005b). The time course of the
vanishing irrelevant set-size effect guided our decision to
set the removal rate parameter r to a value according to
which removal was nearly complete after 2 s. A neuroimag-
ing study with the same paradigm showed that the neural
activity associated with the irrelevant set rapidly declines to
baseline shortly after the cue and reemerges when the same
set is cued as relevant later, directly demonstrating flexible
control of the contents of working memory (Lewis-Peacock,
Drysdale, Oberauer, & Postle, 2011).
Third, independent evidence has emerged for the notion
that selective removal is an active process that not only takes
time but also competes with other processes. Fawcett and
Taylor (2008) combined an item-wise directed-forgetting
paradigm with detection of a visual probe as a secondary
task. The visual probe appeared at variable intervals after the
cue, which indicated for each item whether it should be
remembered or forgotten. Response times to the visual
probe were delayed more after a forget cue than after a
remember cue, demonstrating that forgetting is an active
process that delays response to an attention-demanding sec-
ondary task. This effect was obtained only at delays of less
than 2 s after the cue, in agreement with our estimate that
removing a representation from memory is completed after
about 2 s. Wylie, Foxe, and Taylor (2007) added further
evidence that instructed forgetting of a just-encoded item is
an active process that recruits brain regions not involved in
active remembering or in unintended forgetting. These find-
ings provide evidence that removal of irrelevant information
is different from selective maintenance of relevant informa-
tion, and they point to the fact that an attentional bottleneck
is necessary for the removal of information.
Distractor removal in SOB-CS takes the beneficial role
that in other theories of working memory is taken by re-
hearsal or refreshing. For instance, in the TBRS theory, free
time following a distractor operation is used to refresh
memory items, and refreshing is a crucial component of
how the TBRS theory explains the cognitive-load effect.
In contrast, SOB-CS does not invoke rehearsal or refreshing
to explain any of the benchmark findings.
The present authors differ in the extents to which they
believe that rehearsal or refreshing plays a role for mainte-
nance in working memory. So far, we have not implemented
these processes in SOB-CS for two reasons. The first and
most obvious reason is that a restoration process is not
needed to explain the benchmark findings modeled here.
We have demonstrated that the cognitive-load effect, one
important piece of evidence cited in support of refreshing,
can be explained without appeal to that mechanism. The
second reason is that rehearsal or refreshing is not easily
integrated with the other mechanisms of SOB-CS. Rehearsal
or refreshing in its simplest form would mean that items are
retrieved, using a position cue, and then reencoded by
associating them again with the same position cue. Such a
mechanism would be fairly ineffectual, because encoding an
item for a second time in the same position is dampened by
novelty gating. The expected increase in memory strength
therefore would be minor, at best. This small expected gain
stands against a substantial risk: If the wrong item were
retrieved in a given position, the wrong item would be
encoded in that position, and because that item was encoded
in that position for the first time, it would be encoded fairly
strongly, thus creating substantial interference. In sum, in
the context of SOB-CS, there is little to gain and much to
lose from such a mechanism of rehearsal or refreshing.8
That said, we must underscore that we do not rule out a
role for rehearsal in working memory. It is abundantly clear
that people do rehearse; a substantial proportion of people,
when asked about their strategies on complex-span tasks,
report some form of rehearsal. About one third of partici-
pants report repeating the memory items to themselves as
their main strategy, whereas another third report using no
strategy except for reading the memoranda. The final third
of participants report more elaborate strategies, such as
generating visual images for the to-be-remembered words
or trying to combine the words into sentences (Bailey,
Dunlosky, & Kane, 2008; Dunlosky & Kane, 2007). Thus,
rehearsal as a behavioral phenomenon is well established,
and we do not question its occurrence. Nonetheless, our
simulations show that rehearsal is not necessary as a causal
explanatory construct to account for complex-span perfor-
mance. New data or other data not yet addressed by SOB-
CS may eventually require the addition of such a mecha-
nism (e.g., Jarrold, Tam, Baddeley, & Harvey, 2010).
In this context, it is illuminating that the performance of
those individuals who report rehearsal by repetition is hardly
better than the performance of people who report merely
reading the items as they are presented, lending support to
our contention that rote rehearsal is not needed to explain
memory performance in complex span. Unlike rote
8 There are reasons to believe that this problem is not specific to SOB-
CS. Existing computational models of working memory, including
those that assume a central role for rehearsal, do not model it in detail
(Page & Norris, 1998). In a previous modeling study, we found that
even in the context of a decay-based model, rehearsal can be detrimen-
tal rather than beneficial (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008).
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rehearsal, more elaborate strategies are associated with bet-
ter performance (Dunlosky & Kane, 2007; Kaakinen &
Hyönä, 2007). This pattern of results meshes well with the
earlier analysis that mere retrieval and reencoding of items is
bound to be fairly ineffective in SOB-CS. Exploring the
possibility that elaborative rehearsal might prove more suc-
cessful in the model is a task for the future.
In contrast to rehearsal, removal of distractors has not
figured prominently in self-reported strategies. We do not
regard this as problematic for our model. One trivial explana-
tion could be that no researcher ever considered the need for
active removal. However, we believe that there is more to this
conspicuous absence. Removal is unlikely to be the subject of
self-reports because people report cognitive processes to the
extent that they pay attention to them and remember them.
Removing a no-longer relevant representation implies that it
fades from the focus of attention and vanishes from working
memory. By removing distractors, increasingly clean and dis-
tinct representations of the memory items emerge, which then
have an increasing chance to be remembered later, not only
when it comes to recalling the items, but also when it comes to
reconstructing a memory of one’s own strategy. When asked
what they did during a complex-span trial, participants will
remember that, after processing a distractor, their attention
eventually switched away from that distractor and to one or
more of the items. The experience of this transition, which we
argue is facilitated by removal of the distractors, can plausibly
be described by participants as “refreshing the items” or “re-
hearsal.” The more efficient a person is in removing distractors
from memory, the more rapidly and clearly the memory of the
items would emerge from the fog of interference, and the more
opportunity the person would then have to engage in further
elaborative processes, such as visualizing the meanings of
words or creating sentences from the words. Thus, faster dis-
tractor removal might be the common cause of better memory
and of more elaborate processing of the items.
Limitations
SOB-CS is an attempt to formulate a precise and empirically
adequate model of one particularly popular and fruitful
experimental paradigm of working memory research.
Modeling complex span is clearly a necessary part of what
it means to model working memory. At the same time, we
recognize that it is only a small part of the theoretical and
empirical landscape.
Computational models that spell out assumptions about
representations and processes in as much detail as SOB are
often limited to a single experimental paradigm, such as
immediate serial recall. With the development of SOB-CS,
we are generalizing the model, extending it from simple
span to complex span. Nonetheless, to become a complete
model of working memory, SOB-CS will have to be extend-
ed further to account for behavior on other prototypical
working memory tasks, such as the Brown–Peterson para-
digm and variations thereof (J. Brown, 1958; Jarrold et al.,
2010; Peterson & Peterson, 1959) and memory-updating
tasks (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Chee, 2010;
Pollack, Johnson, & Knaff, 1959; Yntema & Mueser,
1962). The model also needs to be extended to other re-
sponse formats beyond serial recall and reconstruction, such
as free recall (Bhatarah, Ward, & Tan, 2008; Farrell, 2012),
probed recall (Tehan & Humphreys, 1995), and recognition
(McElree, 2001; Oberauer, 2005a). We believe that the
model is well suited for at least some of these extensions.
For instance, updating of working memory requires effi-
cient, targeted removal of representations that must be
replaced (cf. Kessler & Meiran, 2008); SOB-CS already
includes such a mechanism. Recognition requires a quick
assessment of the familiarity of a probe; the computation of
energy in SOB-CS offers a potential mechanism.
SOB-CS is also limited in that it does not make explicit
how working memory relates to long-term memory. We are
not committed to a strong distinction between working
memory and long-term memory as separate systems, so we
use these terms pragmatically as referring to memory phe-
nomena over short time spans (on the order of seconds) and
longer time spans; so far, SOB-CS has addressed only the
former. The role of long-term memory is particularly perti-
nent to modeling the complex-span task. The complex-span
paradigm is strikingly similar to the continuous-distractor
paradigm (Bjork & Whitten, 1974) that has been commonly
interpreted as reflecting recall entirely from long-term mem-
ory. Meanwhile, a substantial body of evidence from exper-
imental (D. McCabe, 2008) and correlational (Unsworth,
2010; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2009) studies, as well
as from neuroscience (Chein et al., 2011), confirms that
processes and performance on complex-span tasks are relat-
ed to long-term memory (Unsworth & Engle, 2007).
The relation of working memory to long-term memory
most likely goes in both directions: On the one hand,
knowledge in long-term memory contributes to recall in
working memory tasks. This is already acknowledged by
all models that assume redintegration of distorted memory
traces (e.g., Nairne, 1990; Schweickert, 1993), because red-
integration requires intact long-term memory representa-
tions of recall candidates. Our simulation of individual
differences in span tasks assumes that these individual dif-
ferences arise in part from variation in the c parameter,
which can be interpreted as reflecting the discriminability
of representations in long-term memory. On the other hand,
processes on working memory tasks generate memory
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traces that long outlast the individual trial (D. McCabe,
2008), exerting effects across trials that are sometimes ben-
eficial, as in the so-called Hebb effect (Hebb, 1961), and
sometimes harmful, as in proactive interference (Bunting,
2006).
So far, SOB-CS models only individual trials. After every
trial, the weight matrix is reset to a state that reflects previous
learning events in a very generic fashion (i.e., simply adding
random noise to all weights with standard deviation No).
Therefore, SOB-CS cannot yet account for interference or
facilitation across trials. An obvious first step to account for
effects beyond single trials would be to assume that the weight
matrix is not reset after each trial, but instead squashed (i.e.,
multiplied by a value between 0 and 1). Squashing would be a
mechanism for removing no-longer-relevant information in a
wholesale manner, which is different from the targeted removal
of individual representations. Incomplete squashing would
leave traces of previous trials, giving rise to proactive interfer-
ence. We anticipate that more sophisticated mechanisms will
be needed to account for other aspects of the link between
long-term and working memory.
One set of mechanisms has been proposed by one of us to
explain the relationship between working memory and episod-
ic memory (Farrell, 2012). Like SOB-CS, this model assumes
that items are associated with a representation of temporal
context, but that some portion of the context is used to bind
together temporally adjacent items into episodic clusters.
Successive lists in a working memory experiment would be
partially separated by temporal context, which contributes to
reducing interference between them. In simulating the effects
of distractor activity in free recall (analogous to the complex-
span tasks simulated here), Farrell assumed that distractors are
clustered together with the item that they immediately follow,
such that they are associated with the same cluster-level con-
text as the preceding item. This parallels the assumptions made
in SOB-CS and opens some avenues of integration across the
two models. Other neural-network models of serial recall are
making progress in explaining the effects of long-term learning
on immediate recall (Botvinick & Plaut, 2006; Burgess &
Hitch, 2006; Page & Norris, 2009), and we see this as an
encouraging development from which we hope to learn for a
future extension of our model.
Relation to other theories of working memory
In this section, we compare SOB-CS to other theories of
short-term and working memory, beginning with a brief
review of other computational models, followed by an at-
tempt to relate our model to some of the most influential
verbal theories of working memory.
Computational models
As already noted, SOB-CS is closely related to other formal
models of serial recall because it originated in that tradition.
As a consequence, SOB-CS retains the achievements of
previous versions of SOB in accounting for a multitude of
phenomena in simple span (Lewandowsky & Farrell,
2008b), thus constituting the first computational model of
working memory that generalizes across two paradigms,
serial recall and complex span.
Several other computational models have addressed
working memory, but they are concerned with paradigms
that are beyond the current scope of SOB-CS (Ashby, Ell,
Valentin, & Casale, 2005; O’Reilly & Frank, 2005;
Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006). We are aware of only two other
models that address complex span, and that are therefore
direct competitors with SOB-CS: the ACT-R-based model
of Daily et al. (2001) and our computational implementation
of TBRS (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011).
Daily et al. (2001) explained capacity limits in working
memory through two factors, one being decay and the other
a limited resource for activating representations that limits the
degree to which, during rehearsal and retrieval, the correct item
can be activated more strongly than competing items. The
model accounts reasonably well for some of the benchmark
phenomena known at the time: the decline of accuracy with
memory-list length and the serial-position curve. The model
also gives an account of individual differences in serial-
position curves for different list lengths by varying a single
parameter—namely, the amount of available resources. Daily
et al. published their model before the benchmark findings
related to cognitive load emerged, but their model has the
potential to account for these effects in a way similar to the
TBRS* model, because the model includes decay and rehears-
al, and it includes a processing bottleneck so that themodel can
rehearse only when it is not engaged in processing a distractor.
We regard TBRS*, our computational implementation of
TBRS, as the strongest competitor to SOB-CS for explain-
ing experimental results with complex-span tasks, and we
therefore focused initially on addressing evidence that has
been cited as being uniquely supportive of TBRS (viz., the
cognitive-load function). We have shown that SOB-CS suc-
cessfully handles those data—and in two regards does so
even more successfully than TBRS*. First, SOB-CS gives a
better account of the cognitive-load effect when it is broken
down into the effects of operation duration and free time
(Fig. 7). Second, SOB-CS correctly predicts the joint effects
of number of distractor operations, similarity between suc-
cessive distractors, and serial position, whereas TBRS*
could not reproduce the pattern of results even with favor-
able ad-hoc assumptions (see Fig. 8).
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We acknowledge that the comparison between SOB-CS
and TBRS* can be regarded as unfair, because TBRS* was
implemented by ourselves rather than by the authors of the
TBRS theory. Thus, despite our best efforts to make TBRS*
as strong as possible, it is conceivable that a better way
exists of implementing the TBRS theory as a computational
model. The mere possibility that this is the case does not
render irrelevant the challenges arising for the TBRS theory
from the present results. If the TBRS theory is to explain the
benchmark data of complex span, then there must be at least
one computational implementation of the theory that can
coherently explain them. In other words, among the many
different ways in which all of the details left out by the
verbal theory can be filled in, there should be at least one
that works. It is now incumbent on proponents of the theory
to show that there is an implementation that fixes the prob-
lems noted above and at the same time retains the success of
TBRS* in accounting for a broad range of other findings
(Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2011).
Verbal theories of working memory
Many readers will ask: Where do I find in SOB-CS the
familiar concepts of contemporary theories of working
memory? The best-known theories of working memory
today are only verbally formulated. They are often broader
in scope than computational models, but lack the precision
of computational models. Here we relate SOB-CS to some
of the better-known verbal theories of working memory.
The working memory theory of Baddeley (1986, 2000)
Probably the most popular theory of working memory is the
one introduced by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) and developed
further by Baddeley (1986, 2000). It consists of four interacting
components: a central executive, an episodic buffer, and two
slave systems for domain-specific maintenance, namely the
phonological loop (for verbal information) and the visuospatial
sketch pad (for visual object information and spatial location).
The episodic buffer serves as a device for maintaining integrat-
ed representations that cut across domain boundaries. At first
glance, it might be tempting to relate the memory mechanism
of SOB-CS—that is, the two-layer architecture, the principles
of Hebbian association, and the redintegration mechanism—to
the two slave systems in Baddeley’s model. However, in SOB-
CS the distinction of two domain-specific subsystems is
unnecessary, because the double dissociations of verbal and
visuospatial contents emerges from the model through the lack
of superposition interference between disjoint representational
domains. For the same reason, SOB-CS does not need a sepa-
rate memory system for entities integrating verbal and nonver-
bal features, such as the episodic buffer; verbal and nonverbal
features can be bound together simply by associating themwith
the same context representation. SOB-CS decidedly differs
from Baddeley’s model in that it assumes no time-based decay
of phonological (or other) memory traces. We regard this as a
strength of our model, because there is no convincing evidence
for decay in verbal short-term and working memory
(Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Brown, 2009).
Nothing in SOB-CS corresponds to the central executive
in Baddeley’s (1986, 2000) model. Clearly, a complete
model of working memory will have to spell out explicitly
the executive processes that control its contents. We have
only begun to do so by formalizing the basic processes of
encoding and removal of representations from memory.
Eventually, models of the memory component of working
memory such as SOB-CS will have to be combined with
computational models of the executive processes working
on the memory contents (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch,
Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Chatham et al., 2011; Verguts &
Notebaert, 2008).
The embedded-process theory of Cowan (1995, 2005)
Cowan (1995, 2005) conceptualized working memory as
consisting of two embedded components, the activated part
of long-term memory and the focus of attention. Activated
long-term memory has no capacity limit, but its contents are
prone to forgetting due to decay and interference. The focus
has a limited capacity of approximately four chunks that it
protects from decay and interference.
It is not obvious how to map SOB-CS onto the main
constructs in Cowan’s theory. The focus of attention in
SOB-CS is limited to a single content–context conjunction
at any time, akin to the notion of a one-chunk focus of
attention in other, related theories (McElree, 2006;
Oberauer, 2002), not to a focus encompassing up to four
chunks. The two-layer architecture and its connecting-
weight matrix, which serves to maintain memory of several
items, does not fit the notion of Cowan’s focus, either: In
contrast to Cowan’s focus, the weight-based memory of
SOB-CS is not limited to a discrete number of chunks, it
is not immune to interference, and it bears no conceptual
relation to attention. If anything, the weight matrix of SOB-
CS could be considered as fleshing out the contribution of
ancillary mechanisms serving maintenance functions over
and above the focus of attention in Cowan’s theory. Thus,
there is currently no counterpart for Cowan’s focus of atten-
tion in SOB-CS. This might be a weakness of our model,
insofar as there is evidence for the characteristic features of
Cowan’s focus—a fixed capacity limit of four chunks and
immunity to interference for those chunks—that cannot be
explained within SOB-CS. The main evidence for a focus
with these characteristics comes from recognition paradigms
that are, so far, outside the scope of SOB-CS (Cowan,
Johnson, & Saults, 2005; Rouder et al., 2008; Saults &
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Cowan, 2007); this observation underscores the need to
extend our model to these paradigms.
One of us (Oberauer, 2002, 2009) has proposed a frame-
work similar to Cowan’s in which the region of direct access
roughly corresponds to Cowan’s focus of attention. In con-
trast to Cowan’s focus, the region of direct access is not
assumed to have a fixed capacity limit in terms of a “mag-
ical number” of chunks, and it is not assumed to be immune
to interference. Rather, the capacity limit of the direct-access
region is attributed to interference between different item–
context bindings that are maintained simultaneously. In
keeping with this idea, interference between item–context
associations plays the main role in explaining the limitations
on retrieval in SOB-CS. Thus, the associative memory
mechanism of SOB-CS can be tentatively interpreted as a
model of the direct-access region, and the current contents
of the item and position layers can be regarded as the
contents of the one-chunk focus of attention in the theory
of Oberauer (2002, 2009).
The theory of executive attention of Engle and Kane Engle,
Kane, and their colleagues developed a theory of working
memory addressing primarily individual differences (Engle
et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2007; Kane & Engle, 2002). They
described performance on the complex-span task as reflect-
ing contributions from domain-specific storage systems,
plus a general resource for controlled, or executive, atten-
tion. They define executive attention as the ability to main-
tain goal-relevant representations in the face of distraction.
In the context of SOB-CS, removal of no-longer-relevant
representations from memory is the mechanism for mini-
mizing interference from potentially distracting representa-
tions. Therefore, individual differences in the removal
parameter could provide an explanation for the associations
between complex-span and executive-attention measures
without any memory component, such as the Stroop effect
(Kane & Engle, 2003) and the antisaccade task (Unsworth et
al., 2004). At this point of model development, distractor
removal is the only control mechanism explicitly modelled,
but other control mechanisms, such as the degree to which
irrelevant information can be prevented from entering work-
ing memory, are also likely to contribute to individual differ-
ences in working memory performance (Awh & Vogel,
2008; Hasher et al., 1999; Jost et al., 2010). We envision
that a parameter for the degree of filtering at encoding will
be added in a later extension of the model.
The executive-attention view could be interpreted in the
context of SOB-CS as the claim that shared variance be-
tween complex span and measures of fluid intelligence
comes primarily from variance in the efficiency of the
executive-control parameters. An alternative view has been
advanced by Colom, Rebollo, Abad, and Shih (2006), who
argued that variance in the “storage” component of complex
(as well as simple) span is responsible for the strong corre-
lation with fluid intelligence. In the context of SOB-CS, this
view would imply that fluid intelligence is mostly related to
the memory parameters (e.g., the distinctiveness parameter
c). A future analysis of individual differences in complex
span in terms of the parameters of SOB-CS might be instru-
mental in moving beyond the dichotomy of “storage” versus
“executive attention” and provide insights into which mech-
anisms and processes are responsible for the differences
between individuals with high and with low complex span.
Neuroscientific theories of working memory
Theories about the neuronal substrate of working memory
can be divided into two classes. The majority of theories
assume that retention in working memory relies on persis-
tent neural firing. An alternative view is that the contents of
working memory are maintained by rapid changes of syn-
aptic weights (e.g., Mongillo, Barak, & Tsodyks, 2008). In
SOB-CS, memory is entirely based on the connection
weights, and as such our model is most compatible with
synaptic-change-based theories of working memory.
Whereas there is compelling evidence for load-dependent
neural activity during working memory retention (Curtis &
D’Esposito, 2003; Vogel et al., 2005), recent evidence has
suggested that this neural activity might not directly code
the contents of working memory. Rather than remaining
active during the entire retention interval, the patterns of
neural activity correlated with working memory contents are
reactivated when needed for processing (Barak, Tsodyks, &
Romo, 2010; Lewis-Peacock et al., 2011). These findings
support weight-based models such as SOB-CS, which (ap-
proximately) reproduce item representations as activation
patterns from the weight matrix when given a cue related
to that item.
At the same time, mapping mechanisms in SOB-CS to
neuronal processes is far from straightforward. For instance,
there is no obvious counterpart in SOB-CS for load-
dependent neural activity during the retention interval. One
possibility arises from the model of short-term synaptic
potentiation of Mongillo et al. (2008), according to which
rapid weight changes require recurrent nonspecific neural
activity to be upheld over time. As more items are encoded,
the weights in the weight matrix deviate further from zero,
and as a consequence, more neural activity might be needed
to uphold the weight matrix. Obviously, this is a very
speculative attempt to reconcile our model with neuroscien-
tific evidence. An important step toward tightening the link
between weight-based models of working memory and neu-
ronal mechanisms would be to investigate the neural sub-
strates of rapid synaptic weight changes.
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Conclusions
SOB-CS provides new answers to a number of pressing
questions in working memory research.
First, with SOB-CS we offer a computational model of
complex span that explains forgetting entirely through in-
terference. Thus, we provide a simple answer to one of the
key questions of working memory research: Why is working
memory capacity limited? In SOB-CS, the capacity limit
arises entirely from interference. This explanation is more
parsimonious than any alternative, because all theories of
working memory acknowledge the existence of interference,
and those that explain the capacity limit by other processes,
such as decay or limited resources, must assume these
processes in addition to interference. We have shown that
a purely interference-based model can explain benchmark
data, such as the cognitive-load effect, that constitute the
empirical foundation for the currently most viable decay-
based theory (Barrouillet et al., 2007; Barrouillet et al.,
2011).
Our computational model provides a clear, unambiguous
formulation of the mechanisms of interference in working
memory, which serves as a starting point for a detailed
empirical investigation of these processes. We distinguish
two kinds of interference, one arising from superposition,
the other arising from confusion. We show that different
kinds of similarity modulate these two kinds of interference
in different ways. The model generates new and in part
counterintuitive predictions about the effect of item–distrac-
tor similarity, which were experimentally confirmed
(Oberauer et al., 2012).
A second question that has long been debated in the
working memory literature concerns the relation between
memory and processing. SOB-CS accounts for the full range
of benchmark findings relating to this issue. The key pair of
assumptions that we make is that all information attended to
during a concurrent processing task is encoded into memory,
and thereby potentially interferes with other memories, and
that interference can be reduced by gradual removal of
irrelevant information. These assumptions lead to the correct
predictions that the cognitive-load effect is primarily an
effect of the free time between distractor operations
(Simulation 2) and that the number of distractors has an
effect on memory if and only if the distractors differ from
each other (Simulation 3).
A new theoretical discovery emerging from our modeling
efforts is the strong link between interference and removal.
Any model that explains the limited capacity of working
memory without appealing to decay must assume some
form of removal of no-longer-relevant information.
Without removal, the available capacity would soon be
cluttered with irrelevant information. SOB-CS is the first
model with an explicit, well-defined mechanism of removal.
Our modeling results also pose a challenge to theories
assuming that memory representations are actively main-
tained by rehearsal or refreshing. As discussed above, we
do not deny a potential role for these processes. However,
our modeling results have shown that benchmark findings
that so far have been interpreted as strong evidence for
rehearsal or refreshing (in particular, the cognitive-load ef-
fect) can be explained without those processes. This finding
raises the question of which phenomena demand the as-
sumption of rehearsal or refreshing. Other modeling work
(Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008, 2011) has shown that,
even in the context of decay-based models, rehearsal is
effective only in a narrow set of circumstances. Taken
together, these demonstrations imply that rehearsal and re-
freshing are not the only conceivable processes of active
restoration; removal of irrelevant information should be
taken seriously as a contender. We have developed an ex-
plicit computational model of how removal could work; we
hope that this encourages proponents of rehearsal or refresh-
ing to specify with equal precision what happens when
people rehearse or refresh.
Another longstanding question is whether working mem-
ory is a unitary system or should be conceptualized as
consisting of several domain-specific subsystems.
Proponents of both views can point to considerable evidence
in their favor. Within our distributed connectionist modeling
framework, we offer a principled explanation that accom-
modates the evidence cited in favor of both sides of the
debate. Working memory is a unitary system that operates
with representations from different content domains.
Different content domains are characterized by different
feature dimensions, which are represented by different sets
of units in the content layer. To the degree that the contents
of tasks carried out concurrently use representations from
different domains, these tasks do not interfere, because the
representations do not overlap in the neural network. In
practice, however, hardly any task is content-pure, and
therefore even nominally “visuospatial” tasks involve some
verbal features, and nominally “verbal” tasks involve some
visuospatial features. This explains why tasks used to rep-
resent different content domains nevertheless interfere with
each other to some degree.
Evidence for both domain-general and domain-specific
aspects of working memory also comes from correlational
studies. Various measures of working memory capacity
share a large proportion of their variance, thus pointing to
a nonnegligible source of variance reflecting general work-
ing memory capacity. At the same time, verbal and visuo-
spatial span tasks load on separate, though correlated,
factors. We have shown that the patterns of correlations
between various simple- and complex-span tasks can be
explained with SOB-CS by assuming individual differences
in two parameters, one domain-specific parameter that
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governs the distinctiveness of memory representations in
simple- and complex-span tasks, and one general parameter
affecting the removal of irrelevant information, which is
particularly important in tasks combining memory with
processing demands. Again, a unitary system operating on
domain-specific representations explains the full range of
results.
In conclusion, we have proposed the first purely
interference-based computational model for a key paradigm
in research on working memory. The model explicitly
describes the basic mechanisms of working memory: encod-
ing of items in their relative positions, retrieval of individual
items by positional cueing, interference from concurrent
processing, and the control of interference by removal of
no-longer-relevant information. The model successfully
accounts for a number of benchmark findings from
complex-span tasks and makes successful new predictions.
We hope that our work will encourage other researchers to
make competing theoretical ideas equally explicit, so that
the debate about the mechanisms of working memory can be
advanced to a greater level of precision.
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